

UNCLASSIFIED

AD NUMBER

AD394109

CLASSIFICATION CHANGES

TO: UNCLASSIFIED

FROM: CONFIDENTIAL

LIMITATION CHANGES

TO:

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Document partially illegible.

FROM:

Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't. agencies and their contractors;
Administrative/Operational Use; 31 JUL 1968.
Other requests shall be referred to Assistant Chief of Staff Force Development, Army Department, Attn: FOR-OT-RD, Washington, DC 20310. Document partially illegible.

AUTHORITY

OAG D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980; OAG D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

**Best
Available
Copy**

GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

IN ACCORDANCE WITH

DDO 5200.1-B & EXECUTIVE ORDER 11052

SECURITY

MARKING

The classified or limited status of this report applies to each page, unless otherwise marked.
Separate page printouts MUST be marked accordingly.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

NOTICE: When government or other drawings, specifications or other data are used for any purpose other than in connection with a definitely related government procurement operation, the U.S. Government thereby incurs no responsibility, nor any obligation whatsoever; and the fact that the Government may have formulated, furnished, or in any way supplied the said drawings, specifications, or other data is not to be regarded by implication or otherwise as in any manner licensing the holder or any other person or corporation, or conveying any rights or permission to manufacture, use or sell any patented invention that may in any way be related thereto.



CONFIDENTIAL

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310**

IN REPLY REFER TO

AGAM-P (M) (19 Nov 68) FOR OT RD 683262

25 November 1968

AD 394109

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, Period Ending 31 July 1968 (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. Subject report is forwarded for review and evaluation in accordance with paragraph 5b, AR 525-15. Evaluations and corrective actions should be reported to ACSFOR OT RD, Operational Reports Branch, within 90 days of receipt of covering letter.
2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure that the Army realizes current benefits from lessons learned during recent operations.
3. To insure that the information provided through the Lessons Learned Program is readily available on a continuous basis, a cumulative Lessons Learned Index containing alphabetical listings of items appearing in the reports is compiled and distributed periodically. Recipients of the attached report are encouraged to recommend items from it for inclusion in the Index by completing and returning the self-addressed form provided at the end of this report.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

1 Incl
as

DISTRIBUTION:

Commanding Generals

US Continental Army Command
US Army Combat Developments Command

Commandants

US Army War College
US Army Command and General Staff College
US Army Adjutant General School
US Army Air Defense School
US Army Armor School
US Army Artillery and Missile School
US Army Aviation School
US Army Chaplain School
US Army CBR Weapons Orientation Course

DEC 9- 1968

Regraded unclassified when separated
from classified inclosure.

This document contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 793 and 794. It is the property of the Government, is loaned to you, and must be returned to me or to my successor in office in such manner to an unauthorized person.

CONFIDENTIAL

DISTRIBUTION (Cont'd)

US Army Chemical School
US Army Civil Affairs School
US Army Engineer School
US Army Infantry School
US Army Intelligence School
US Army Medical Field Service School
US Army Military Police School
US Army Missile and Munitions School
US Army Ordnance School
US Army Quartermaster School
US Army Security Agency School
US Army Signal School
US Army Southeastern Signal School
US Army Special Warfare School
US Army Transportation School

Copies furnished:

Office, Chief of Staff, US Army
Deputy Chiefs of Staff
Chief of Engineers
Chief of Research and Development
Assistant Chiefs of Staff
The Surgeon General
The Provost Marshal General
OSD(SA), Assistant for Southeast Asia Forces
Defense Documentation Center
Research Analysis Corporation (Library)
Security Officer, Hudson Institute
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (Code RF)
Senior Army Representative, Marine Corps Development & Education Command
Army Representative, COMSEVENTHFLT
Commanding Generals
 US Army Materiel Command
 US Army Flight Training Center
 US Army STRATCOM
 1st Infantry Division
Commanding Officers:
 US Army Aviation Test Activity
 US Army Limited War Laboratory
 US Army Logistics, Doctrine Systems & Readiness Agency
Project Manager, Naval Inshore Warfare Project Office
USAF Air Ground Operations School
The Air University Library
Documents Control Officer, Bell Aero Systems Company

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION
APO San Francisco 96345

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

SEE DISTRIBUTION

1. (C) Section 1, Operations: Significant Activities.

a. (C) Introduction.

(1) The 1st Infantry Division, during this period, continued the combined offensive Operation TOAN THANG (Complete Victory) with increased pressure being maintained on VC/NVA efforts to reorganize and resupply in base camps along the periphery of the 1st Infantry Division Tactical Area of Interest (TAOI) in northeast and northwest Binh Duong Province. Extensive land clearing was accomplished, primarily along the Binh Duong and Binh Long Province boundary into the Michelin Rubber Plantation and along Highway 16 north of Tan Uyen. Route security operations continued along Highway 13 to QUAN LOI with daily convoy traffic maintained. Overwatch of US Special Forces activities, Vietnamese Governmental installations, and ARVN activities in the Division's TAOI continues.

(2) Base Camp activities continued at the four division base camps located at DI AN, PHU LOI, LAI KHE and QUAN LOI. Base camps were subjected to VC/NVA attacks by fire to a lesser degree than during the previous reporting period with LAI KHE being the most frequently targeted base camp.

(3) On 12 June, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (minus one squadron) became OPCON to the division and remains in that status at the close of this reporting period.

b. (C) Personnel and Administration.

(1) Personnel:

(a)	Strength	OFF	WO	EM	AGG
	Authorized 1 May 68	1070	177	15858	17105
	Authorized 31 Jul 68	1047	174	15408	16629
	Assigned 1 May 68	1096	167	16528	17791
	Assigned 31 Jul 68	1002	170	16015	17187

(b) Gains, qualifications and status

1. Enlisted:

a. Replacements received: 4845.

b. Outstanding requisitions: Sr Enl Grades: 05B4P (1), 05C40 (1), 11B40 (12), 11C40 (6), 31Z50 (1), 11D40 (2), 11F40 (5), 11G50 (8), 11F50 (2), 12B40 (4), 12Z50 (2), 13B40 (1), 13Z50 (6), 63C40 (3), 63Z50 (4), 67M40 (1), 67Z50 (2), 71H40 (3), 71L40 (1), 71L50 (1), 73Z50 (1), 76J40 (1), 76Y40 (3), 82C40 (1), 91B40 (1), 91Z50 (1), 94B40 (15), 95B40 (1), 97B40 (1). E6 and below: During the quarter, emergency requisitions were submitted for 301 personnel due to shortfalls in fill of normal monthly

FOR OR RD
683262

Inclosure 1

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

WDB-M (LND)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period ending
31 July 1968, RDS COMINT-65 (RL), (U)

requisitions (May - 234, Jun - 17, Jul - 50). Lead time on such requisitions is 60 days. In July, 89 of the 234 requisitioned in May were received.

(c) Credits: None

(d) Qualifications: None

(e) Status: Same

(2) Officer:

(a) Replacements received 521

(b) Outstanding requisitions: 5

(c) Credits: Adequate replacements were received for losses, however, a shortage of Captains still exist in combat arms particularly Infantry.

(d) Qualifications and status: Lieutenant fills being received for requested Captain requirements, particularly in combat arms Infantry and Artillery.

(c) Losses:

(a) Enlisted: There were 4252 losses during the quarter due to reassignment within Vietnam, rotations, WTS, and board action.

(b) Officer: There were 406 losses during the quarter due to reassignment within Vietnam, rotations, WTS, and board action.

(4) Losses due to casualties were as follows:

(a) May:	OFF	10	1	36
KH.	3	1	27	91
SH.	36	4	451	491
EDO	0	0	3	3
EDR	1	0	41	42

(b) Jun:				
KH.	9	0	55	64
SH.	34	0	349	383
EDO	0	0	3	3
EDR	0	0	38	38

(c) Jul:				
KH.	3	0	27	30
SH.	13	0	199	212
EDO	4	0	4	4
EDR	2	0	42	44

(2) Discipline, Law and Order:

(a) During the past quarter there were no stragglers apprehended. There were 34 serious incidents and 26 WOLs reported to the PI during the period and 16 apprehended.

(b) There was 16 General Courts-Martial tried during the quarter. A total of 61 records of trial for Special Courts-Martial and 16 records of trial for Summary Courts-Martial were received for review.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVM-T (BHD)

SUBJ CT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, NCS COMFOR-65 (RL), (U)

(3) Graves Registration: During the quarter there were 159 remains processed and evacuated.

(4) Development and Maintenance of morale:

(a) Chaplain: During the quarter there were 1932 religious services conducted with a total attendance of 59,193.

(b) During the quarter 4466 out-of-country R&R allocations were utilized.

(c) Awards and Decorations:

Medal of Honor	0
Distinguished Service Cross	3
Distinguished Service Medal	0
Legion of Merit	20
Silver Star	145
Distinguished Flying Cross	69
Soldier's Medal	19
Air Medal Valor	50
Air Medal Merit	1571
Bronze Star Valor	476
Bronze Star Merit	2381
Army Commendation Medal Valor	305
Army Commendation Medal Merit	3360
Purple Heart	772
Certificate of Achievement	0
TOTAL	9171

(5) Civilian Personnel:

(a) As of the end of the quarter the division employed 1050 daily hire local nationals.

(b) There were 721 permanent hire local nationals employed at the end of the quarter.

c. (C) Operations.

(1) General: Phase I, Operation T-24 TM-VG (Complete Victory) initiated 060001 April, with all organic and attached units, continued into this reporting period terminating 012400 May. Phase II followed and continues as this report period ends. From 1 April to 24 April VC/VN forces avoided contact and remained generally in a defensive posture. However, a limited number of major units continued to conduct restricted limited objective operations in the vicinity of Saigon. Other major units withdrew from the Saigon area into base areas in northeast and northwest Binh Duong Province in order to receive replacements and resupply in preparation for the second general offensive which commenced on 25 April and continued until approximately 5 June. Although Division operations in VC/VN sanctuaries in late March through April deprived VC/VN forces of large quantities of supplies and equipment and in deference to extensive re-connaissance in force operations and ambush patrols in the Lai Khe area, large VC/VN forces were again able to penetrate deeply into the Lai Khe/Saigon area to conduct ground attacks and attacks by fire against critical installations. Numerous attacks by fire were initiated against Saigon with 107mm and 122mm rockets. The four 1st Infantry Division base camps received attacks by fire with Lai Khe Base Camp being hit 17 days during the period by rockets. The VC/VN second offensive was defeated before objectives could be accomplished.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVB-1 (LID)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS USFOR-65 (R), (b)

and major forces have withdrawn into sanctuaries. An extensive programmed land clearing operation northwest of L.I. K.M. was completed and additional clearing operations continue south of L.I. K.M. as the report period ends.

(2) Force Disposition. (a) At the beginning of this report period, the weight of division forces was maintained in the southern portion of the T.O.I. (see unit locations, inclosure 12). The 1st Brigade employed one battalion (-) at Song Be, one mechanized battalion (-) along Highway 13, a two company Task Force at M.L.C and a two company Task Force at QUAN LOI.

(b) The 2d Brigade employed one infantry battalion in the THU DUC and L.I. THI LU area, one cavalry squadron in the BIEN HOA and PHU LOI area, one cavalry troop (OPCO) and one infantry battalion in the PHU LOI area. Headquarters and D Troop, 7-1 Air Cavalry was OPCO to the brigade.

(c) The 3d Brigade employed one infantry battalion in the vicinity of L.I. K.M., one battalion in the "rocket belt" west of L.I. K.M., one battalion in the north L.I. SONG area and one in the central L.I. SONG area, and one battalion in DO DUY LINH. A Troop, 7-1 Air Cavalry was OPCO to the brigade.

(3) Land Clearing Operations. (a) The 1st Engineer Battalion, using organic equipment, began clearing the M.L. LOI Base Camp perimeter 24 April and through 9 May 531 acres had been cleared. The 26th Land Clearing Team (LCT) OPCO to the 3d ABG began clearing operations in the vicinity of L.I. K.M. Base Camp on 27 April. The cut around the perimeter was broadened and by 2 May 1447 acres had been cleared.

(b) On 3 May, the 27th Land Clearing Team became OPCO to the division and both the 26th and 27th LCT's moved to the vicinity of M.L. Binh Long (AT 7954) and began clearing operations east and west along the Binh Long-Binh Buong boundary road in an operation called GI. T.S.-NH. A 1000 meter wide swath was cut by home plows through the jungle from the Song Be River (AT 8553) to the Michelin Rubber Plantation (AT 6052). The boundary road was upgraded as the clearing operation progressed. A 300 meter cut was made through the Michelin to the vicinity of B.B. Tin G (AT 5047). Additional cuts were made north and south of the boundary road, into the "rocket belt", the expansive area from which N. Vietnamese units have launched rocket attacks on L.I. K.M. Base Camp. The 27th LCT terminated participation in Operation GI. T.S.-NH on 12 June having cleared 4532 acres. The 26th LCT continued the operation until 26 June clearing 9263 acres. Total acreage cleared was 13,895 acres.

(c) On 7 July the 27th LCT returned to division OPCO and began clearing operations in the vicinity of M.L. LOI (AT 8040). The clearing operation continued south generally along Highway 13 which is referred to as the T.O.I. boundary cut. Through 27 July, the 27th LCT had cleared 6064 acres. The 1st Engineer Battalion conducting clearing operations in the same general area since 15 May through 31 July cleared 2719 acres. Further land clearing south of L.I. K.M. continues. See photo prints, inclosure 17.

(4) Operation RO - TH. G, Phase I. (a) Contact on 1-2 May was light. However, in 3d Brigade operations, the highly responsive A Troop, 7-1 Air Cavalry with elements of D Troop, 1-4 Cavalry attached, detained one Viet Cong suspect in the vicinity AT 861345 on 2 May. In the same general area, light fire teams engaged and killed three Viet Cong at AT 933300. At AT 93320 six Viet Cong were engaged one of which was killed. The Viet Cong returned fire on the light fire teams wounding one trooper in the leg. Continuing the aerial search, light fire teams destroyed five sampans and detained one suspect on the Song Be River in the vicinity of AT 93748.

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDB-2 (100)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSAR-65 (4d), (U)

(4) On 3 May division forces repositioned along Highway 13 in preparation for land clearing operations in the vicinity of AF 40-40 LONG (AF 7954). In the 2d Brigade Task force PHN LOI (AF 7615), the 2-2d Infantry conducted reconnaissance in force and night ambush patrols. At 0330 hours, a D Company ambush patrol executed an ambush against an undetermined number of Viet Cong. At first light the area was searched locating nine VC KL. (DC). Two Viet Cong were captured, as were four AK47's, one handgun, three ammunition pouches, two US canteen cups, one poncho liner, one first aid pouch, one US pack and shoulder straps, four US pistol belts, 6 AK47 magazines, one VC poncho, one US hand grenade, one air matress, 25 pounds of rice and miscellaneous documents. In the 3d Brigade P.O.A., night ambush patrols were also active. A Company, 2-16 Infantry, ambush patrols engaged five Viet Cong in the vicinity AF 44307 at 1917 hours. Miscellaneous medical supplies and clothing were located. At 2125 hours a sec w/ ambush patrol (AF 32303) engaged an estimated 20 Viet Cong. In the sporadic contact that continued until 2300 hours, eight Viet Cong were killed and one M16 rifle was captured. There were no US casualties.

(c) The most significant actions during this reporting period took place over the next four days in the 2d brigade task force.

1. The 1-1C Infantry conducted reconnaissance in force and night ambush operations from DI w/ Base Camp. D Company on 4 May was tasked to conduct a reconnaissance in force in the vicinity of AF 40-40 (AF 920105) following intelligence indicating a Viet Cong ammunition cache was located in the area. Departing the DI w/ north gate (AF 907002) at 0800 hours, D Company moved 1000 meters north along the MSR and then 1500 meters northeast cross country to T-4 HLF. Entering the outskirts of the hamlet, the absence of civilians was immediately noted. Proceeding cautiously, D Company encountered AK47 and RPG fire at 0945 hours in the vicinity of AF 919104. An intense fire fight ensued with the platoon leaders becoming initial casualties. Artillery supported initially, followed in approximately ten minutes by light fire teams. The enemy fire was suppressed, however, attempts by B Company to maneuver provoked additional encounters. The Reconnaissance Platoon on standby at DI 1 as a ready reaction force was alerted. With a platoon, 1-4 Cavalry attached, the Reconnaissance Platoon reinforced D Company at approximately 1100 hours, initially securing a PZ (pickup zone) and assisting in extracting casualties. A and B Companies, 1-1C Infantry were alerted at 1000 hours, B Company having returned from a night ambush patrol two hours before and A Company standing down for the annual General Inspection.

2. Determining a sizable enemy force had been encountered, the 2d Brigade diverted available resources to reinforce and support the contact. The 1-4 Cavalry (-) was diverted to the rear as was Headquarters and D Troop, 7-1 Air C Cavalry. A Company, 1-16 Infantry departed DI AF by foot at 1145 hours. B Company, 1-16 Infantry departed DI AF at 1200 hours by trucks from com at support units. Disounting on the MSR due west of the contact, B Company moved to reinforce. B Troop (-), 1-4 Cavalry moved into a blocking position north of the contact. A Troop, 1-14 Cavalry with elements of B Troop attached and A Company 1-16 Infantry reinforcing, moved into a blocking position along a road running to the southeast. Light fire teams covered the open rice paddy on the east. B and D Company with the Reconnaissance Platoon attached, then swept to the east. The VC/V. forces dug in on the inside of irrigation ditches, many shoulder deep in water and others submerged treasuring through mud, were routed. The 1-16 Infantry moved along the outside of the berms tossing grenades over into the irrigation ditches forcing the VC/V. to abandon their holes. 160 machine gun and M16 rifle fire swept the ditchus length wise. C/N. fleeing to the east

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

WD-B-1 (HD)

SUBJ-CT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RGS CSDR-5 (M), (U)

were caught in the open by light fire teams and D Troop, 7-1 Air Cavalry which was inserted to the west. Contact was broken at 2045 hours resulting in 260 VC KIA (EC) and 5 PW's captured. The following equipment was also captured: 28 AK47's, 10 RPG's, 1 SNS rifle, 1 K54 pistol, 1 US M2 carbine, 3 RPG-7 launchers, 4 MG-2 launchers, 1 Russian bolt action rifle, 9 bandoliers AK47 ammunition, 1 C24 CM R VZ24-58P, 7 RPG rounds and 17 coasters, 3 US M2 hand grenades, 2 VC grenades, 1 60mm mortar sight, medical supplies, 15 loaded AK magazines, 1200 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, 1 82mm mortar tube and tripod and numerous pieces of wet gear, blankets, and hammocks.

3. The Viet Cong forces encountered were identified as elements of 21st Battalion, 5th VC Division and 1st Battalion, Dong Nai Regiment apparently on separate missions but relative to the VC/NVA second offensive.

(d) Additional action in the 2d Brigade T-20 developed before the battle at T-20 HMLP had ended. The 2-2d Infantry conducted reconnaissance in force and night ambush patrols in the vicinity of PHU LOI Base Camp employing one company during daylight and conducting two company size ambush patrols at night.

1. At 1728 hours, A Company cordon set an airmobile insertion in the vicinity of AT977218. At 1945 hours while moving northeast toward a built up area established along a north-south trail, A Company made contact with three Viet Cong (XN86222). The area was swept at first light the following morning locating 1 VC KIA (EC), 2 AK47's, 2 SNS rifles, 20 sets of new wet gear and 5 pair of sandals.

2. At 1815 hours, B Company conducted an airmobile insertion in the vicinity of AT941190 establishing an ambush at AT 937203. At 2125 hours the ambush was executed against 50 to 60 Viet Cong moving southwest through the open rice paddies (approximately 10 kilometers north of T-20 HMLP). The Viet Cong took cover behind the rice paddy berms and began withdrawing to the northwest into a heavily wooded area west of the rice paddies. Contact was broken at 2205 hours. Sweep of the area located one VC KIA (EC).

3. Division relocate. Brigade boundaries and 2-2d Infantry was again with its parent 3d Brigade. This did not affect the battalions operation. The next morning, 5 Aug, a combat tracker team was attached to the 3d Platoon, D Company. Tracking the Viet Cong force, the tracker dog led the platoon northwest to the southeast corner of a Viet Cong base camp in the vicinity of AT935237. Initial contact was made at 1530 hours. The reconnaissance Platoon and one platoon, L Troop, 3-11 Cavalry over immediately to reinforce arriving from the northwest at approximately 1900 hours. Attempts to assault the base camp from the north and east were unsuccessful. Tactcial air, light fire teams, and artillery support and an assault was made from the southwest. The short action of the mechanized force resulted in a successful sweep of the base camp. There were no US casualties. The contact resulted in 51 VC KIA (EC) and 4 PW's capture. Two prisoners were from the 2nd Artillery Battalion (EC) to the 21st Infantry Battalion, the 21st having been deserted by the 1-1 Infritary the previous day, and the other two prisoners were from the 1st Army Service Group which apparently was to link up with the 21st Infantry Battalion and provide logistical support. These two actions interdicted and spoiled the plans for the 5th VC Division's attack on HMLP Hau Air Base.

(e) Another devastating contact began 5 to two kilometers south of PHU LOI Base Camp (2d Brigade, T-20) in the vicinity of the hamlet XOM 101 (2), AT972134.

4. D Troop, 1-4 Cavalry conducting reconnaissance in force operations

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

WD-1 (1:D)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, MCS C3R/R-35 (RL), (U)

in the 1-4 Cavalry .0 made contact with scattered VC/NVA outposts as it advanced north along a planned route. At approximately 1305 hours B Troop made heavy contact. Each attempt to advance was met with heavy recoilless rifle, RPG and small arms fire. Light fire teams in support received ground fire from KT870131. Tactical air and artillery were requested and B Troop pulled back. A Troop reinforced B Troop at 1500 hours and after the air and artillery preparation, conducted a coordinated attack on enemy positions. The use of massed armor in conjunction with .50 caliber machine gun fire and cannister from the 90mm tank gun suppressed the enemy fire enabling both Troops to penetrate the enemy positions. After penetration, the utilization of flame thrower equipped A.C.V.'s and hand grenades resulted in heavy enemy casualties. Aircraft observed small groups of two and three Viet Cong scattering in all directions. Light fire teams engaged the fleeing groups, adding additional heavy casualties. Contact broke at 1950 hours.

2. The following day, 6 May, A Troop with 2d Platoon, B Company, 1-18 Infantry attached, conducted reconnaissance in force in the same area as A Troop, 7-1 Air Cavalry scored from the air. At 1050 hours vicinity of KT88138 light fire teams, 7-1 Air Cavalry engaged eleven Viet Cong. A Troop engaged one Viet Cong at 1110 hours and at 1230 hours vicinity of KT870130 located twelve Viet Cong. All were killed the day before. Scattered contacts continued into the afternoon. At 1700 hours, heavy contact was made as the forces assaulted the battle area of the previous day using massed armor. Contact broke at 1530 hours. At 1859 hours, a CS drop was made on the area followed by artillery fire. US losses were 5 KIA and 21 WIA. Three tanks received minor damage and one tank, moderate damage. Viet Cong losses during the two days were 440 KIA (IC). Equipment captured included 2 M-50's, 6 M-47's, 1 RPG-2 launcher, 1 60mm mortar, 1 12.7mm heavy machine gun with 360 rounds of ammunition, 1 82mm mortar bipod and 6 rounds, 2000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition, 5 hand grenades, 25 1/2 pound blocks of petric acid and 2 blasting caps, 1 roll of radio antenna wire and a CHICO wire set, 19 rucksacks, 13 shovels; miscellaneous food items, individual clothing and equipment.

3. Suspecting a vast tunnel complex in the area, elements of the 1-4 Cavalry searched the area throughout the next three days locating tunnels, one a hospital, and the following equipment: 1 82mm mortar tube, 2 base plates, 1 bipod, 52 increments, 60 rounds and 40 fuses; 1 12.7mm CHICO heavy machine gun and 650 rounds; 1 .50 caliber heavy machine gun; 1 60mm mortar, 57 rounds, 26 fuses and 11 propellant charges; 1 DKG 7.62mm light machine gun and 90 rounds of linked ammunition; 1 M14 rifle and 3000 rounds of 7.62mm ammunition; 8 M-47's and 1000 rounds of AK (7.62mm) ammunition; 1 RPG-7 launcher and 1 RPG booster; 4 RPG-2 launchers and 7 boosters; 31 RPG rounds (unspecified type); 1 75mm recoilless rifle and 1 round; 1 flame thrower LOP 50 (without tanks); 34 hand grenades; 1 6 pound AT mine; 14 shaped charges; 27 Bangalore torpedoes; 1 CHICO field telephone and 24,000 feet of command wire; 1 camera bag and 5 rolls of 16mm film; 3 CHICO flashlights; 15 hammocks; 24 pair of socks; 100 pounds of assortable clothing; 28 entrenching tools; 100 pounds of rice, 24 pounds of other food items, and 3 large cooking pots; miscellaneous medical supplies and 10 pounds of documents.

4. The 165th NVN Regiment was identified as the unit in contact. The Regimental Commander rallied to ARVN forces and stated losses were so heavy that its mission could not be carried out.

(f) On 7 May the 1-21 Infantry, OPCOM to 2d Brigade, conducted reconnaissance in force and night ambush patrols in the L1 THI-U area. The night defensive position was located at KT885031. C Company was conducting

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

ANB-B-T (1 ED)

Subject: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS USFOR-65 (SI), (U)

ambush patrols from a night operational base west of THU DUC.

(1) A squad from C Company conducting a night ambush site reconnaissance received small arms fire at 1025 hours in the vicinity of KS91992 from an unknown number of Viet Cong. At 1049 hours the patrol became heavily engaged at KS917984. C Company immediately reinforced the patrol and became heavily engaged with an estimated Viet Cong battalion. At 1200 hours D Company and the Reconnaissance Platoon made an armored insertion north of C Company to reinforce. A Troop, 7-1 Air Cavalry supported. The patrol was extracted at 1400 hours enabling the artillery and light fire teams to be more effectively utilized. At 1500 hours B and D Company, 2-1d Infantry made an armored insertion into blocking positions, D Company on the east and B Company on the south. A Troop, 1-4 Cavalry and one platoon, B Troop reinforced along the two major roads bordering the area of contact on the west and south. C Company, 1-2d Infantry was inserted on the west at 1755 hours when B Company, 1-1d Infantry assumed responsibility for the 1-2d Infantry BP. At 1900 hours the infantry elements pulled back into ambush positions covering all avenues of approach into the area of contact. 1-4 Cavalry elements returned to 1st AB Base Camp. Contact was made with the enemy throughout the night as the VC/MN attempted to break out of the encirclement. Flareships supported. At 0900 hours the following morning, A, C, D, 1-2d Infantry made an attack from the north and swept through the area of contact. A thorough sweep of the surrounding area was made with scattered contacts occurring throughout the day of 8 and 9 May.

2. Viet Cong losses were 95 KIA (IC), 2 PAs, 9 small arms and 8 crew served weapons were captured. US losses were 11 KIA and 24 WIA.

(g) On 11 May the Reconnaissance Platoon, 2-2d Infantry and the 3d Platoon L Troop, 3-11 AR conducted reconnaissance in force in the 3d Brigade T-2R northwest of PHU LOI. At 1420 hours in the vicinity AT97273 contact was made with an estimated Viet Cong company. At 1758 hours A Company, 2-2d Infantry was air assaulted into the vicinity of AT904279 and moved overland to reinforce. With tactical air, artillery and light fire teams supporting, a coor initia attack was made on the enemy positions. Contact was maintained until approximately 0115 hours. US forces withdrew to AT999-275 until daylit at which a sweep was made of the area of contact. Scattered contacts were made commencing at 0900 hours at AT92272. Contact had broken by 0935 hours. There were 39 WIA (IC). Two PAs, 7 AK47's, 2 RPG-2 and 1 M-60 launcher were captured. One PA was from the Transportation Company 141st BN Regiment and the second was from the 1st Battalion, 141st. US losses were 2 KIA and 16 WIA. One tank was destroyed when hit by RPG rounds.

(h) The 2-1d Infantry, 2d Brigade, continued extensive reconnaissance in force operations in the NH-HG area east of Saigon. On 15 May, A Company conducted reconnaissance in force approximately 11 kilometers northeast of the 1-2d Infantry contact on 7-6 May. In the vicinity of KS902990, A Company received small arms and automatic weapons fire at 0910 hours from an estimated 5-6 Viet Cong in bunkers interspersed among buildings of a hamlet. A Troop, 7-1 Air Cavalry light fire teams and artillery supported. The tempo of the battle increased against an unknown size force. At 1725 hours, C Company reinforced A Company and the contact ensued until 1910 hours. Seven AK50 rifles, 2000 rounds of AK ammunition, 3 RPG-7 rounds with boosters and 7 RPG-2 rounds with boosters were captured. Moving into the area again in the following day, C Company captured a wounded Viet Cong, 3 AK47 rifles, 1 Soviet M-56 7.62 light machine gun and located 32 VC KIA (IC). The PA from the 3d Battalion, 1st Regiment stated the 3d and 4th battalions were engaged and his unit losses were 100 killed and 30 wounded.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

WDB-T (RHO)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFor-65 (RL), (U)

US losses were 10 KIA and 13 WIA. On 18 May an RF/PF platoon from THU DUC District located in the area of contact 5 .547 rifles, 1 CHICOM light machine gun, 1 60mm mortar, 1 82mm mortar tube and 1 homemade rifle.

(i) B-Company, 2-18 Infantry conducting operations southeast of THU DUC 16 May, in the vicinity of AT977962, located and destroyed 20 RPG-2 rounds, 134 CHICOM hand grenades, 13 recoilless rifle rounds, 2 claymores and 1 RPG-7 launcher. Also located and evacuated were 1 RPG-7 launcher, 1 CHICOM 7.62mm pistol and 20 .547 rifles.

(j) The BIG RND ONG continue Operation TOAN THANG, Phase I, through 31 May without significant contact after 15 May. Rapid reconnaissance in force operations in likely enemy sanctuaries, extensive ambush patrols along NC/NV routes of infiltration/exfiltration, extensive land clearing operations along the Binh Long-Binh Duong Province boundary and key installation security operations in the THU DUC-LAI THI U area continued to adversely affect NC/NV operations.

1. Of significant note are the 1321 ambush patrols conducted during May of which 73 made contact resulting in 120 VC KIA and 12 PW's. The ambush patrol losses were 1 US KIA and 19 US WIA. The vital information secured from the PW's and documents captured were instrumental in conducting successive operations that led to the interdiction of VC/NV forces and the location of base camps and weapons caches.

2. Operation TOAN THANG, Phase I, was completed 312400 May 1968 with the following accumulative results: US: 118 KIA, 682 WIA (533 evad); 3 .547's, 1 mine plow, 1 (1/2) ton truck, 1 VTR, 3 tanks, 10 helicopters damaged; 1 erector, 5 helicopters, 1 ammo carrier, 1 (5) ton truck, 3 (2 1/2) ton trucks, 2 tanks, 3 .547's, 1 mine plow destroyed. VC: 1739 KIA (EC), 491 KIA (poss), 46 P.W.'s, 1 railcar, 893 antiaircraft; 2708 bunkers, 80 sampans, 362 individual weapons, 79 crew served weapons, 405 mortar rounds, 36 RPG rounds, 44380 rds of S. ammo, 38 M-79 rounds, 1025 grenades, 103 anti-personnel mines, 91 anti-tank mines, 31 bicycles, 97 tons rice, 5 tons salt, 13 tons food stuffs, 71 122mm rockets, 29 107mm rockets captured/destroyed.

(5) Operation TOAN THANG, Phase II, commenced 010001 June 1968 and continues as this report period ends.

(a) Extensive reconnaissance in force and ambush operations continued to be conducted to hinder resupply and replacement activities and to prevent the possible infiltration of major newly infiltrated units into the III Corps Tactical Zone.

1. On 1 June, 1-16 Infantry OICOM to the 1st Brigade conducted reconnaissance in force, eight ambush patrols and land clearing security operations in the vicinity of AT642525. C Company conducted reconnaissance in force and at 1245 hours in the vicinity of AT612546 located an estimated company sized base camp. The following items were located and evacuated: 81 SKS rifles, 3 7.62mm light machine guns, 3 7.62mm Mauser rifles, 6 rifle grenade launchers, 125 rounds of 12.7mm ammunition, 1 PRC 10 radio, 2 CHICOM 1B radios, 1 10 volt generator, 1 CW transmitter (homemade), 1 CW receiver (homemade), 9 assorted batteries, 1 doublet antenna, 50 rounds of AK ammunition, 2 M-79 rounds, 1 plastic gas mask and assorted radio accessories. The following items located were destroyed: 150 rounds T.M., 3 CHICOM rifle grenades, 3 CHICOM fragmentation grenades, 30 kilometers of commo wire, 300 rounds of 12.7 ammunition, 850 rounds of AK ammunition, 1 plastic gas mask, 20 bunkers, 12 assorted batteries and 3 car phones. On the following

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (RND)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1), (U)

day, C Company moved back into the area for further search. At 1251 hours in the vicinity of AF611540 three Viet Cong fired on elements of the company. Artillery supported and the area was swept locating one large bunker which was destroyed. At 1409 hours, two Viet Cong were engaged in a bunker. The Viet Cong returned fire with small arms and one RPG. Three US were wounded and two RVN KIA (VC). An unknown number of Viet Cong withdrew to the north. The following equipment was captured: 1 SKS rifle, 1 CHINCOM bolt action rifle, 1 belt of 7.62 ammunition, 4 grenades, 4 RPG's, 6 rifle grenades, 3 concussion grenades, 6 M72 rounds, 1 rifle grenade launcher, 3 Viet Cong ponchos, and 1 pound of documents. Destroyed were 6 bunkers (8' x 10') with overhead cover, 1 mess hall with 3 ovens and 6 spider holes.

2. On 3 June, 1-11 Cavalry became OPCON to the BIG and O-1s and moved to PHU LOI Base Camp. Division units began relocating in preparation for the 3d Brigade controlled operation NO DUTY VI in a Viet Cong sanctuary south of PHUOC VI H. The 2-16 Infantry (-) and elements of 1-4 Cavalry established FSPB Normandy II (AF911319) followed by A Battery, 2-33 Artillery on 4 June.

(1) The 3d Brigade commenced operations in NO DUTY VI (see overlay inclosure 18) on 6 June. The 1-11 Cavalry moved overland toward YT 0435. The 2-28 Infantry completed an airmobile assault at 0955 hours in the vicinity of X1967351 and established a FSPB followed by C Battery, 1-7 Artillery. The most significant activity took place the first two days.

1. The 1-11 Cavalry moving into the NO made contact with elements of the 165th RVN Regiment which continued sporadically through the day. At 0732 hours vicinity AT875395, a D Troop tank hit a mine and using no casualties. The tank was repaired. At 0852 hours vicinity AT954405, D Troop received one round of RPG fire. Returning fire, the troop continued to move. At 1014 hours D Troop vicinity AT939404 received small arms fire from an unknown number of RVN. Fire fight ensued resulting in 3 RVN KIA (VC) and 3 RPG rounds captured. A Troop made contact with an unknown size force at 1430 hours vicinity AT941404. Small arms and RPG fire was received from the north, east and south. Artillery and light fire teams supported. B Troop reinforced. Contact was broken at 1730 hours. US losses were 2 KIA and 13 WIA. WIA losses were 9 RVN KIA (VC) and 1 PW, with an M47, was captured from the 3d Battalion 165th RVN Regiment.

2. The 2-28 Infantry made contact with scattered small groups of RVN beginning at 1430 hours in the vicinity of AF9536-AT9735 which continued throughout the afternoon. Two Viet Cong were killed. At 2340 hours, D Company ambush patrol engaged 30-40 Viet Cong in the vicinity of AT959353. Light fire teams, mortars, and artillery supported the contact which continued until 070135 hours. There were no US casualties. There were 4 RVN KIA (VC), 3 M16 rifles, 1 SKS rifle and documents captured. The ambush remained in position and at 0425 hours the ambush was again executed. This time, against a much larger unknown size force. Light fire teams and artillery supported. Light fire teams received .50 caliber or 12.7mm machine gun fire with no damage to aircraft. Contact broke at 0440 hours resulting in no US casualties. One RVN was killed and two individual weapons captured.

3. On 7 June, B Troop, 1-11 Cavalry received an 12mm mortar and ground attack at 0608 hours vicinity AT940403 as the troop prepared to move. An aerial observer, artillery and light fire teams supported. Two US were wounded and contact broke at 0633 hours. Counter-mortar fired on suspected RVN mortar locations and a sweep of the site located 16 RVN KIA (VC) and 1 M47 capture. Both A and B Troops continued to have scattered contacts throughout the day in which 4 RVN were killed and 2 M47 rifles, 2 unknown type rifles, 1 60mm mortar round, 1 82mm mortar round, medical supplies

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

.VDB-T (FMH)

SUSJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL), (U)

and documents were captured.

4. On 12 June, A0 DUTY VI was renamed A0 VOODOO by II FFV and the A0 boundary changed slightly (see overlay inclosure 19). On 13 June, 1-28 Infantry completed an airmobile insertion into A0 AODD, vicinity of YTO15285. B Troop, 1-11 Cavalry secured the landing zone and became OPCON to 1-28 Infantry. C Company, 1-28 Infantry completed an airmobile insertion at the 1-11 Cavalry position, vicinity YTO42360, OPCON to the Squadron.

5. Scattered contacts continued to be made almost daily as base camps varying to regimental size were located. Large amounts of supplies and equipment were located which were evacuated or destroyed. The 11th AC became OPCON to the Division 12 June and assumed responsibility for A0 VOODOO 26 June. The 2d Brigade forces, to include 1-11 Cavalry, disestablished positions and prepared for operations west of L1 Khe Base Camp. The operations in A0 VOODOO significantly hampered the VC/VN use of the area as a sanctuary as the statistics through 31 July indicate. A0 VOODOO continues.

VC/NVA KL. (BC)	107	Bangalore torpedoes	15
VC/NVA PW	2	Rice (tons)	17.9
Ralliers	2	Salt (lbs)	3630
Small arms	58	Pearms (lbs)	1500
Crew served weapons	5	Automobile	1
RPG rounds	100	Bicycles	6
Mortar rounds	176	Motor like	1
Small arms amm	21112	Medical kits	21
Grenades	1460	Uniforms	50
Mines	121	Sewing machine	1
Mine detonators	5	Individual equipment	
Explosives (lbs)	60	Documents (lbs)	35
		Bunkers	569

(c) Throughout June and July, the 2d Brigade maintained the 2-18 Infantry in the THU DUC area. Scattered contacts were encountered throughout the period and weapons caches located as a result of rapid and continuous reconnaissance in force operations which severely hampered VC/NVA efforts to continue pressure on Saigon from the east and northeast. Presented below are the more significant statistical data, including captured or destroyed items, resulting from the battalion's activities 1-30 June.

VC KL. (BC)	54	82mm mortar rounds	93
VC PW's	4	Grenades	138
Rallier's	1	Mines	10
Individual weapons	46	107mm Rockets	34
Crew served weapons	13	140mm Rocket fuzes	50
Small arms ammunition	9250	Gunner quadrant, Russian	2
RPG rounds	115	57mm Recoilless rifle, rds	8
RPG boosters	25	75mm Recoilless rifle, rds	9
60mm mortar base plate	1	Bunkers	154
60mm mortar tubes	3	Sampans	8
60mm mortar bipods	2	Explosives (lbs)	18
60mm mortar rounds	45	VII pinsters	11,500

(d) The 11th ACR, minus one squadron, became OPCON to the BIG RRD OME 12 June. This provided a responsive and manoeuvrable force that could be readily employed in the generally open terrain between L1 Khe and PHU LOI through which VC/VN forces infiltrated/exfiltrated releasing infantry battalions for employment in jungle sanctuaries. The 11th ACR established

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AJD-B-T (I.H.D.)

SUBJ/LCT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS USFOR-65 (AL), (U)

AO BL CKHOMSA (see inclosure 20) and on 26 June assumed responsibility for AO VOONHO immediately adjacent. The 11th ARB remains in this posture as the reporting period ends.

(e) On 26 June, the 3d Brigade commenced operations in AO MaCa west of Lai Khe Base Camp (see inclosures 15 and 21). The Infantry battalions conducted airmobile assaults into the area while the 1-11 Cavalry moved overland. The composition of the force on initial disposition follows:

AT533383

1-16 Inf (-)
B/1/11 Cav
C/2-33 Arty (105)

AT62132

1/11 Cav (-)
A/1-16 Inf
How Btry/1/11 Cav (155)

AT573353

2-28 Inf (-)
A/1-28 Inf
A/1-7 Arty (105)

AT649328

D/1/11 Cav
C/2-28 Inf

1. There were no significant contacts with enemy forces during the fifteen day operation, however, significant weapons and food caches were located and intelligence information gained. Significant operational statistical data, which includes captured items evacuated or destroyed, follows:

VC KL. (EC)	14	Rice, lbs	39250
VC PW	1	Milk, quarts	846
Individual weapons	9	Sugar, lbs	1300
Crew served weapons	1	Burns, lbs	1500
SA ammunition, rds	45122	Cooking oil, gal	20
RPC rounds	1028	Pens, lbs	3500
Mortar rounds	48	Salt, lbs	770
Grenades	34	Blasting caps	14
Mines	26	Entrenching tools	19
Bunkers	196	bicycles	14

2. AO MaCa terminated 10 July.

(f) The 1st Brigade conducted an operation in AO QUANG 26 June - 10 July as a follow-up of B-52 strikes (II FFV targets) in the area in which combat damage assessments revealed heavy movement in the area after the strikes. The taskforce organization employed included the 2-2 Infantry (ABCH) (-); C Company, 1-16 Infantry and the 1st Platoon, B Company, 2-34 Armored supported by artillery at FSB Thunder I on Highway 13 (see inclosure 15). No significant contact occurred, however, as in AO MaCa significant quantities of supplies and equipment were captured, a few were destroyed and further intelligence gained. Significant statistical data follows:

VC KL. (EC)	22	Mines	39
VC PW's	2	SA ammunition	3022
Individual weapons	6	Lathes	1
Crew served weapons	1	Motor	1
Grenades	59	75mm RR rounds	14
Mortar rounds	128	Bicycles	1
Bunkers	496	Salt, lbs	1500
Rice, lbs	33875	Mortar tubes	2
		TNT, lbs	600

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-T (RHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSRAR-65 (JL), (U)

(g) On 12 July 1-11 Cavalry moved overland to NAM LOI, OFCON to the 1st Brigade, and on 17 July began conducting re-connaissance in force in the LOC NHMH area (AB 7810). At 180000 July in the vicinity of AB773-105, C Troop received RPG and small arms fire. A Troop reinforced and, in an attempt to flank came in contact. Tactical air, light fire teams and artillery supported. Contact broke at 0930 hours. US casualties were 12 WIA. NV losses were 10 WIA KIA (EC) and 1 WIA captured. The following equipment was also captured: 4 AK47 rifles, 2 S-5 rifles, 3 RPG-2 launchers, 10 RPG rounds with boosters, 6 7.92mm machine gun memo drums, 11 AK magazines, 554 rounds of AK ammunition, 136 rounds of link 7.92 ammunition, 2 7.92 machine guns, 23 CHICOM grenades, 4 anti-tank grenades and 4 pounds of documents. At 1020 hours, B Troop in the vicinity of XU780134, three kilometers to the north of C Troop, made contact with an estimated NV company. Light fire teams and artillery supported. At 1135 hours, B Troop was mortared. The fire fight was intense with the NV forces utilizing RPG's, small arms and machine guns. The NV broke contact at 1305 hours and B Troop pursued locating a base camp that had been hastily evacuated in the vicinity of AB303143. US losses were 2 KIA and 15 WIA. NV losses were 20 WIA KIA (EC) and 2 PVTs. Captured equipment included 6 AK47 and 10 K50 rifles, 1 CIC and 1 S-5 rifles, 1 flame gun, 1 9mm pistol, 3 7.92mm machine guns, 1 60mm mortar base plate, 5 RPG launchers, 2 CHICOM PNC-25 type radios, 30 rounds of 82mm mortar and 21 rounds of 60mm mortar ammunition, 12 RPG-2 and 3 RPG-7 rounds, 11 RPG boosters, and 13 anti-tank grenades.

(h) The 1st Brigade, following up intelligence gained from the LOC NHMH contacts of 16 July, employed additional forces northeast of LOC NHMH (see inclosure 16). Division selected targets were struck by B-52's in the area. As the operation continues at the close of this reporting period, base camps with large caches of equipment and rice are being located.

(i) Casualties sustained by the 1st Infantry Division and by VC/NV forces, including VC/NV PW's:

	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
US KIA	91	64	30	185
US WIA	491	383	212	1086
VC KIA (EC)	1274	337	262	1893
VC PW	42	28	16	86

(j) During this report period B-52 strikes have increased in the BIG K5B OII LOI as 70 BIG AND OII selected targets and 38 II FFV selected targets have been struck. These strikes have caused tremendous destruction to base camps. These strikes are being followed up with ground operations and there are indications that this conjunctive effort has forced some major units into or near the Cambodian border.

d. (U) Training. During the reporting period the training posture of the division remained excellent.

(l) Replacement Training: The division continues to operate five replacement training centers. Each center utilizes the same POF, which in turn conforms to US AR Reg 350-1. The following number of personnel were trained during the reporting period.

	<u>MAY</u>	<u>JUNE</u>	<u>JULY</u>	<u>SUM-MTH</u>
1st Bde	329	266	299	914
2d Bde	346	307	426	1061

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

WIBB-T (1 HD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS SSFolk-65 (M), (6)

3d Bde	597	304	402	1303
Div Arty	161	213	130	504
Spt Cmd	201	91	155	447
TOT.L	1634	1201	1414	4249

(2) Mobile Training Team: Traveling to various field locations throughout the division area, the mobile training team trained twenty-five rifle companies, one artillery battery, and a composite group from the attached ComIntelligence Battalion for a total of 1045 personnel trained during the reporting period.

(3) New Equipment Training Team (NETT): During the period, twenty personnel associated with handling and firing of the XM-429 fuse for the 2.75 inch rocket and the XM-229 rocket warhead received training relative to use of the munitions from the XM-429/XM-229, INCOI, New Equipment Training Team.

(4) KAC-Q Numerical Code System Classes: Classes on the use of the KAC-Q numeral code were conducted 5-29 July. During this period a total of 807 individuals received instruction. Below is a division break down of the people receiving the KAC-Q numeral code system instruction:

1st Bde	494
2d Bde	52
3d Bde	151
Div Arty	59
Spt Cmd	51
TOTAL	807

(5) Reciprocal Mobile Training Team: The division is presently involved in a reciprocal training agreement with the RVN 5th Infantry Division. Under present terms of the agreement, 5th ARVN Division provides two NCOs to instruct in the Division Kit Carson Scout Program. In reciprocation, this division furnishes two NCOs instructors for the 5th Division Training Center. During the period, the Kit Carson Scout Program and the National Training Center graduated 66 and 1170 personnel, respectively.

(6) ARVN Battalion Refresher Training: This division is responsible for conducting a one month refresher training program for the twelve ARVN Infantry Battalions stationed within the Division TAOI. Due to tactical necessity, only one battalion may be trained per month. Two Battalions were trained during the reporting period.

(7) TDY Schools in and out of Vietnam: Schools and number of personnel attending are listed below:

AAMTAP Course	36
AH-1G NETT Course	20
DS Maint Course	5
Executive ADP Orientation	
Course	1
Jungle Survival	11
RECONDO	37

e. (C) Intelligence

(1) Enemy Order of Battle

(a) The total estimated strength of the enemy military units operating

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

I&S-R (10)

A&W CP: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period ending
31 July 1968, RCS COMFOR-15 (R1), (b)

in the 1st Division tactical area of interest (TAOI) is approximately 18,800 personnel. This figure represents a combat strength of about 14,000 personnel, with an additional 4,800 personnel providing logistical support. A minimum figure for infiltration into III CTZ is known to be about 26,000 personnel since T.T., 1968. This is a figure indicating at least 4300 personnel per month infiltrating into the III CTZ area. The known rates of infiltration in retrospect appear to have been adequate to maintain strength in III CTZ and to increase enemy strength in the 1st Division TAOI. At present, known infiltration into III CTZ was at least 6,700 men during May, 200 men in June and 400 in July, 68. Exact current figures for infiltration into the 1st Infantry TAOI are not known.

(b) Specific reinforcements available from outside the Division TAOI are from the 9th VC Division, the 5th VC Division, the 101st NV. Regiment, the 36th NV. Regiment and the 273C and Cu Chi VC regiments. All units within the Division TAOI can be expected to have artillery units in support.

(c) The accepted locations of confirmed enemy units within the Division TAOI and along its periphery are:

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>STRENGTH</u>	<u>COMBAT EFFECTIVENESS</u>	<u>CURRENT PROB LOC</u>
<u>7TH NV. DIVISION</u>			
HO & Spt Units	6000	FCB	Loc Ninh Area
500	N/A		Loc Ninh Area
13th Arty Bn	UNK	UNK	Loc Ninh Area
141st NV. Regt	1500	FCB	Loc Ninh Area
155th NV. Regt	1500	FCB	Loc Ninh Area
32nd NV. Regt	2000	FCB	Loc Ninh Area
<u>SECP. R. TO REINFORCS</u>			
Dong Lai Regt	1200	ICB	Binh My Area
Song Be Regt	600	ICB	Bo Duc District
Thu Duc Regt	400	ICL	Vic KS 9594
33rd NV. Regt	2000	FCB	Loc Ninh Area
<u>69TH VC ARTY GRD</u>			
64th Arty Regt	1000	CB	Vic KS 9791
208th Arty Regt	650	UNK	Elms vic XT 7808
K33 Arty Bn	350	CB	Vic XT668438
K34 Arty Bn	600	CB	Vic YT281051
52 Arty Bn	400	CL	Vic Filhol
<u>LOC L FUNCN UNITS</u>			
C61 Ben Cat Co	80	CL	XT 7725
C62 Chau Thanh Co	65	CE	XT772213
C63 Lai Thieu Co	30	NCL	XT888119
C64 Dou Tieng Co	100	CL	XT525556
C65 Phu Cuong City Flt	30	CL	XT 7929
K127	30	ICB	YT 1182
C127 Co	70	CL	YU 0900
D186 Bn	200	FCB	YU 1715
C275	50	CL	YU 1005
K10 Co	40	NCL	YT 1875
K11 Co	60	CE	YU 2510
K14 Co	100	CE	YU 3520
K16 Co	60	CL	XU 9815
K17 Co	50	CE	YT 0590
K18 Co	30	NCE	YU 4210

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (HQ), (U)

K19	70	CB	YU 4003
C300 Dong Nai Co	46	NC	AT 9021
C301 Phu Giao Co	80	CL	XT91A365
C302 Tan Uyen Plt	35	CL	AT 9224
C303 Co	70	CL	AT905433
Di An Plt	30	CL	AT 9709
C65 Loc Ninh-Plt	40	CL	XU630050
C55 An Loc Plt	40	CL	AT830570
C45 Chon Thanh Plt	30	CL	AT693680
C271 Co	70	CL	YU 0900
C70	130	UNK	XT790950
C71	UNK	UNK	YU120050

ADMINISTRATIVE

SERVICE UNITS

81st Rear Service Gp	1800	U/A	HQ vic YT 2555
83rd Rear Service Gp	1165	U/A	Sul-Region 1 & 5
85th Rear Service Gp	430	U/A	HQ vic XU 8716
86th Rear Service Gp	1400	U/A	HQ vic YU 2042

(d) Main Force Combat Units within the 1st Infantry Division T.O.I.

(a) 7th NV. Division: The 7th NV. Division consists of the 141st, 165th and 32nd NV. Regiments. The elements of this division dropped out of contact after the May Offensive and were not located by contact again until 18 July, when 1/11th AR contacted the 32nd NV. Regiment vicinity XU303143. In addition to providing the first indication of the 32nd regiment's subordination to the 7th Division, this contact led to identification of the division north and northeast of Loc Ninh. The 7th NV. Division has not been located as far north as it currently appears to be since 27 October - 3 November 1967, when it combined forces with elements of the 9th VC Division for the attack on LOC NINH.

1. 165th NV. Regiment: The 165th NV. Regiment set up its base camp in the BIEN MY area (AT 9033) in mid-April, remaining in this area until early May. Phan Viet Dung, former CO of the 165th Regiment who rallied on 7 May, stated that the responsibility of the regiment for the May Offensive was the area from south BINH CHUONG City to north LAI THIET with the following missions: Destroy at least one battalion and two companies of the enemy's allied force (main target was the 5th ARVN Division). Support local forces in destroying all the RVN AR Teams and help them create new government agencies, with the main areas being BIEN SON, BIEN THIEN, and BIEN CHUONG. Be prepared to enter the 1st Precinct of S-IGAR when ordered. In late April the regiment moved southward out of its base camp in the BIEN MY area to the vicinity of the PHU YEN Training School (AT 8413) where it was contacted by U. S. and ARVN forces, losing over 500 men as a result of the battle. Since the regiment suffered an extraordinary amount of losses in this contact it withdrew to its base camp in the BIEN MY area to regroup.

2. 141st NV. Regiment: The 141st NV. Regiment established a Base Camp in the BIEN MY area in mid-March, remaining in the area until early May. According to Phan, the mission of the 141st Regiment during the May Offensive was to operate as a reserve element of the division. In the initial phase it would intercept ARVN and allied replacements from BINH MY to BINH CHUONG. Then, it would prepare to replace the 16th Regiment in the LAI THIET District area if the 165th Regiment entered Saigon or withdrew to BIEN MY. On 13 May the 1st TF at AT937290 received two well coordinated ground attacks by the 141st Regiment which suffered 67 KIA. On 26 May elements of the 141st and 165th regiments joined forces and attacked the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDE-T (MND)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOM-65 (RL), (U)

Australian FSB Corral at XT93333". Results were 47 enemy KI. and 7 PWs. Rollers and documents confirmed the location of the 141st and 165th Regiments in the BINH NY area during June. After the May Offensive the 165th Regiment did a good job of evacuating the dead and wounded, while the 141st reportedly did a poor job.

3. 32d NVA Regiment: On 17 July the 11th AR made contact with an enemy force at XU803143 which was later identified as the 32nd NVA Regiment, formerly subordinate to the 1st NVA Division, II CTZ. Documents captured after the contact include a directive reassigning the 320th Regiment (AKA 32nd) from the 1st NVA Division to Group 70s (the 7th NVA Division). The 32nd Regiment had recently come from KONTUM Province, II CTZ, where it had been out of contact for approximately 90 days. On 28 July, 1st Lieutenant Pham Luc (RN) of 47L hospital rallied to the LUC BINH NATIONAL POLICE. Pham has been assigned the mission of inspecting all elements of the 7th NVA Division. He stated that the 7th Division left the BINH NY area on 2 July, arriving in LOC NAM District on 20 July. Pham gave the present locations of the 7th NVA Division Headquarters, 141st, 165th and 32nd NVA Regiments as XU 8019, AB 7815 respectively. Pham also confirmed the fact that the 32nd Regiment is now subordinate to the 7th NVA Division. He stated that the Division is at full strength; however, he has no knowledge of the division's mission except to resupply, retrain, and receive replacements.

(4) 5th VC Division: During the 2nd Offensive the 5th VC Division is believed to have performed a supporting role for the main force regiments tasked against Saigon. There were only two major contacts within the Division T.O.I. in which elements of the 5th VC Division were identified.

1. 21st Battalion: On 4 May, vic AT919104, 1-18th Infantry and 7-1 Air Cavalry made contact with enemy units resulting in 260 VC KI. and 5 PWs. Study of captured documents and interrogation of PWs revealed that elements of the 21st Independent Bn, 5th VC Division had come to Van Hiep Village on 4 May to rendezvous with 20-30 local VC. At the same time, same place, elements of the Dong Mai Regiment were possibly linking up with an U/I enemy unit. The 21st Bn, which may have been a recon element of a larger element of the 5th VC Division, and a Supply Unit of COSVN attempted to continue their mission despite losses. The 21st Bn probably had to link up with the 1st Rear Services Group for necessary logistic support in an upcoming attack on the Bion Hoa Air Base. On 5 May, vic AT937237, 2-28th Inf and 3-11 AR made contact with elements of the 1st Rear Services Group and elements of the 22nd Artillery Bn (OPCO to the 21st Bn). The results of this action were 61 VC KI. and 4 PWs. This action interrupted logistical support required by the 21st Bn (and possibly a larger VC attack force) and was the final blow that destroyed the planned attack by the VC Division against Bion Hoa.

2. 274th VC Regiment: On 14 May, vic AS942924, the 5th Marine Bn captured a PW from the artillery element, 1st Bn, 274 Regt. He stated that his mission was to provide artillery support for the 4th LF Bn which was operating in the Saigon area. However, it is believed that the bulk of the 274th Regiment was located east of the Division T.O.I. Two PWs captured on 27 May, vic AT553271, following a contact by 3-43 ARW, 13th Division, identified the 2nd Bn, 274 Regiment as a new infiltration group. This new infiltration group took the place of the former 2nd Bn which was now operating in the Thu Duc area as part of the 1st Regiment, Sub-Region 4. The last contact in which elements of the 274th Regiment were identified was on 22 June vic AT502352 with 3/43 ARW. Results of the contact were 76 VC KI. and 1 PW. The PW identified the 3rd Bn, 274th Regiment. However, it is believed that the 274th Regiment is still operating in the vicinity.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (VHD)

SMBJ-CT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFRM-65 (A), (U)

of Dinh Quan (TF 5637) where it may be regrouping and resupplying. There exists the possibility that the 1st Bn, 274th Regiment may be located in the Thu Duc area. A PW captured on 4 July, vic AS991926, by A/2-18 claimed to be a commo-liaison soldier from the 1st Bn, 4th Regt (274th Regt), 5th VC Division. He stated that his unit was located near Saigon.

3. 275th VC Regiment: During the time period of 1 May to 31 July, only one contact was made with elements of the 275th Regiment within our T.O.I. On 3 May, vic AT937194, B/2-21 made contact with an enemy force resulting in 9 VC KIA and 2 PWs. One of the PWs was identified as a major of the 2nd Co, 2nd Bn, 275th Regt. Sometime during the month of May, the 275th Regiment relocated from Southern War Zone "D" to the Bai Loi Woods area where on 22 May vic AT533290 a contact was made in which the 275th Regiment was identified by documents. Contacts and documents captured since that time indicate that they continue to operate in the area probably protecting supply lines and performing harassing missions on allied outposts and installations.

(c) Dong Nai Regiment: During the month of April the Dong Nai Regiment underwent reorganization in anticipation of its mission in the upcoming Offensive. The regiment was upgraded by strengthening it with replacements from newly arrived infiltration troops and by incorporating the 3rd Local Force Bn which became the K3 Battalion of the regiment, replacing the Phu Loi Bn which in turn became the K4 Bn. Approximately 1 May the Dong Nai Regiment moved out of its base areas in southern War Zone "D" enroute to the Saigon area. On 4 May elements of the regiment, along with the 21st Independent Bn, were identified in contact with 1/18th, 1st Division vic AT919104. The results of this contact were 260 VC KIA and 5 PWs. Two of the PWs were identified as members of the Dong Nai Regiment. The regiment continued on its way to Saigon where on 5 May the K1 Bn made contact with ARVN Marines vic of the Binh Loi Bridge, AS71971. The results of this contact were 54 VC KIA and 5 PWs. The same date, vic AS921946, 2nd ARVN Bn captured a PW in the vicinity of a bridge that had been blown. The PW was identified as a member of the 1st Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. Also on the 5th, an estimated enemy battalion attacked the Then Than Gia Bridge, vic AS63933. ARVN Marines reacted killing 72 VC KIA and capturing a PW. The attacking unit was identified as the 3rd Local Force Bn and the C20 Signal Co., Dong Nai Regiment. Following the contact the K3 (3rd LF Bn) withdrew to the Hiep Binh area where on 7 May, vic AS891992, C/1-28/1st Division was attacked by an estimated reinforced battalion. The results of this contact were 41 VC KIA (EC) and 66 VC KIA (Poss). A PW captured the following day, vic AS90993, stated that his unit had been in contact the previous day. The PW's from the 3rd LF Bn. The PW also stated that the K1 Bn was in the area. Ba Sinh, CO of Sub-Region 5, stated that the K2 Bn was also involved. Following this contact the K2 Bn evacuated the wounded to base areas north of Ben Tre District. On 9 May, vic AS9910, C/1-28 located 2 VC KIA. A short time later 5 VC were engaged resulting in 5 VC KIA. Documents identified elements of the Dong Nai Regiment. On 7 May vic AS89990, B/1-28 engaged 5 VC. A short time later artillery was fired into the area where more VC were sighted. A sweep of the area the following day located 17 VC KIA. Documents identified a medical section of Binh Duong Province and the 2nd Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. On 11 May, C/1-28 reinforced by A/1-28 made contact with an unknown size enemy force resulting in 31 VC KIA vic AT 70020. Documents found in the area the following day identified the C1 and D4 Companies of the Phu Loi Bn and the Lk Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. Elements of the 1st ARVN Cav captured a PW on 14 May vic AT864114 who was identified as a medic with the K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regt. The PW stated that the K2 Bn had departed War Zone "D" on the evening of 13 May and had arrived in the area the morning of 14 May. 4-9 ARVN on 15

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (RHD)

SUBJ/LCT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (KL), (U)

Key, vic AT870034, made contact with an estimated VC platoon resulting in 1 VC KL.. Documents identified the KL as a member of the D800 Bn (KL, Dong Nai Regt). On 16 May vic AT-70130, 749th Regional Forces captured a PW from the K3 Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. The PW allegedly stated that his unit was moving from Bien Hoa to the Saigon area. 17 May, a rallied from the Transportation group, Dong Nai Regiment turned himself in vic AT854075. The PW stated that he was a member of a 100 man group from the Dong Nai Regiment who were moving south to Lai Phieu, guided by C63 LF Co. On 19 May, vic AT854034, 3/6, 5th ARVN captured 4 PWs during a sweep operation. Three were guerrillas and one was from the Transportation Unit, K5 Bn, Dong Nai Regt. The PW stated that the K1, K3 and K5 Bns along with an U/1 LF Company, were to attack the Binh Lai Bridge on the night of 20 May 68. 1/6th, 5th ARVN, vic AT855926 captured a PW on 18 May. The PW stated he was from Phu Loi II (possibly K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regt). The Dong Nai Regiment resumed the offensive on Saigon on 20 May when the K1 Bn crossed the Saigon river and opened the way to Ben Hai strategic hamlet. The battalion suffered heavy casualties in contact with ARVN soldiers. The 1st Company of the K1 Bn was in charge of taking the wounded soldiers back in the rear. The K3 and K4 Bns of the Dong Nai Regiment crossed the Saigon river north of Binh Lai Bridge on the night of 24 May. They proceeded through Ben Hai Hamlet toward the Cong Thi intersection, Bien Hoa, where they were stopped. The K2 Bn didn't cross the river until 30 May. The Bn then proceeded to the area north of Ben Cat Canal where it was stopped. When an airstrike was directed on the Dong Nai Regiment Hqs in the Lap Thanh Pn oda on 4 June, all communications with the K3 and K4 Bns were lost. As a result the K3 and K4 Bns withdrew from the area on the night of 7 June via the Ben Hai Hamlet area. K4 had a strength of 35 men and K3 had only 20. All but four of these were wounded to some degree. During this time period several small contacts were made with elements of the Dong Nai Regiment within the Division PnO. On 30 May, vic AT87046, 4/6th ARVN located a large weapons and medical supply cache and captured 3 VC PWs. One PW was identified as a company commander in the Dong Nai Regiment. On 29 May, vic AT870043, an estimated VC squad engaged 4/6th ARVN resulting in 4 VC KL. and documents captured. A sweep of the area the following day located 15 more VC bodies. The documents identified elements of the Dong Nai Regiment. 4/6th ARVN, vic AT85046, captured a VC PW from the rear service elements of the Dong Nai Regiment on 2 June. The same date, B/5-12, 199th Bde made contact with an unknown number of VC vic YT034323 resulting in 14 VC KL.. The following day, 2 more VC bodies and 1 VC PW wounded in the previous day's contact were found. The PW stated that he was from the K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regiment and that he and 100 others were on their way from a hospital to rejoin their unit. On 4 June, vic AT86017, D/2-16 captured a PW from the 2nd Co, 4th Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. The PW stated that he and sixty others had left the Binh My area approx 3 days ago for the purpose of joining the rest of the battalion in the Saigon area. The PW was separated from the rest of the sixty man group when they were hit by artillery. A rallied from the K5 Independent Rear Services Bn rallied vic AT 8514 on 3 June. He stated that the K1, K2 and K3 Bns of the Dong Nai Regiment had picked up rice vic AT874127 on the 7th of June. He also stated that the K4 Bn had come through Binh Thom vic AT865011 moving north the night of 7 June. A PW captured on 9 June, vic AT935030, stated he was the Deputy Commander of the Dong Nai Regiment. He further stated that the headquarters of the Dong Nai Regiment was located vic AT856028, AT857029, AT858030 and AT860025. On 10 June, vic AT891063, the Lai Phieu Intelligence Platoon conducted a search operation resulting in 2 VC captured. One of the PWs was identified as a recon-platoon leader of the K4 Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. On 12 June, an asst platoon leader of the K4 Bn, Dong Nai Regiment rallied in Thu Duc District. The rallied stated that the K1, K3 and K4 Bns of the Dong Nai Regt planned to cross the Saigon river vic AT 8701 and move to

CONFIDENTIAL

VDB-T (NHD)

SUBJ.CP: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1964, RCS CSFOR-65 (kl), (U)

Binh My on the night of 12 June. The K2 Bn had been ordered to entrench in Gia Dinh Province and attack an unknown target in the near future. The same date, vic KS 719/2, B/1-26 made contact with an unknown number of VC resulting in 1 VC KIA and 2 PWs. One PW, who later died, stated that his mission was to direct the units of the Dong Nai Regiment going to Saigon. C/1-18 AF engaged 6-8 VC vic AT864076 resulting in 2 VC KIA on 14 June. Documents identified the KIA as members of the K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. One document disclosed the strength of the K2 Bn as of 22 May as 419 with 232 present for duty. Sometime between 9-14 June, the K2 Bn recrossed the Saigon River vic AT 8601 to attack Saigon (possibly the K2 Bn was to reinforce elements of the Quyet Thang Regt). One PW stated that on 14 June contact was made with the 1st VC Bn and the K2 suffered many casualties. Following the contact, some of the men were told to defend positions in place while others withdrew east of the Saigon River to Highway 13 to the North. On 15 June, 3rd VH Bn made contact with elements of D2 vic AT371002 resulting in 86 VC KIA and 4 PWs. Following the contact it is believed that the rest of the battalion recrossed the river. On 15 June vic AT852086, D/1-13 engaged an unknown number of VC resulting in 2 VC KIA and 4 PWs. The PWs were identified as members of C24 Transportation Company, Dong Nai Regt. One PW stated that they had carried approx 100 wounded VC to the Thuam Giac area. On 17 June, vic AT875085, C/1-16 AF conducted an ambush resulting in 6 VC KIA. Documents possibly identified the K2 Bn. The same date, vic AT865015, 1/26 captured a PW in the vicinity of a contact the previous day which had resulted in 30 VC KIA. The PW identified as a member of the 7th Co., K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. He also stated that he had been a member of the 270 Infiltration Group which had arrived in Huoc Long Province approx 3 weeks prior to his capture. Also on 17 June vic AT83049, A/1-4 engaged an enemy force resulting in 11 VC KIA. Documents identified the C6 and C7 Companies, K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. Finally on 17 June, vic AT829079, A/1-4 made contact with an enemy force resulting in 7 VC KIA and 2 PWs. One of the PWs was identified as the XO of the 5th Company, K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regt. On 18 June, three ralliers from the Dong Nai Regiment rallied at different locations. One VC who turned himself in to C/2-16 vic AT 8233, stated he was from the C5 Company, K4 Bn, Dong Nai Regt. He located his battalion approx 3½ hours walk east of Binh My. Another VC who rallied vic AT 8113 stated he was from the 2nd Company, K1 Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. He further stated that he believed his battalion was located vic AT859235. Finally a member of the C6 Company, K2 Bn rallied to A/1-16 vic AT873082. The rallier was able to provide details of the route from Binh Nhieu to Linh My used to carry wounded VC. On 19 June, vic AT83012, the RF-FF Company of Phu Duc captured 9 PWs. One PW was identified as the Chief of Staff of the Advanced CI of subregion 1. He stated that his mission was to take two platoons of replacements to assist the 1st and 2nd Bns of the Quyet Thang Regt in Gia Dinh. The other PWs were identified as members of the Lk Bn, Dong Nai Regiment. On 24 June, vic AT83399, an ARVN OF received a rallier from the Phu Lai I Bn (K4 Bn, Dong Nai Regt). The rallier stated that his unit had been located northwest of Phu Giac when it had been hit by a B52 strike resulting in 15-20 KIA and many wounded. The unit had then moved southwest of Phu Giac. The rallier further stated that at the time of his rally he believed his battalion to be located vic AT925387. 1/6th ARVN captured 4 VC who were hiding in a hole vic AT659125 on June 25. These PWs were identified as members of the K2 Bn, Dong Nai Regt. These PWs were probably stragglers from the K2 Bn. It is believed that by this time all of the battalions of the Dong Nai Regiment had withdrawn to base areas in the Catcher's Mitt to regroup, resupply and receive replacements following heavy losses suffered in the Saigon area. On 5 July, vic AT91933, B/2-16 AF engaged 4 VC resulting in 4 VC KIA. Documents identified the Rear Service Group supporting the Dong Nai Regiment. On 23 July, vic AT919340, an AF

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (PHD)

SUBJ.CT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, IADS CSFCD-65 (R1), (U)

of the 2-16 engaged 3 VC resulting in 2 VC KI. Documents identified the 1st BN, Dong Nai Regt. A/I-16 captured an NVN PW on 21 July in a large base camp, vic AT956351. The PW stated that he was a member of a 300 man infiltration group which was to join the Dong Nai Regiment. On 25 July, vic AT925336, an A/I from 2-16th captured a PW believed wounded in the contact on 23 July. The PW stated that the Regiment was originally located in company size base camps in the Suoi Oi area (AT 9736). The PW further stated that the Regiment was undergoing regrouping and retraining and that a new mission was to be announced soon. The PW also stated that the Regiment had heavy weapons, varied between the Binh Loi Bridge (AS 977) and Binh Nhieu Village (AT 8306). On 27 July, 1-20 and elements of 1/9 ARVN engaged 6 VC while conducting a seal of Binh Chanh Village (AT 85145) resulting in 5 VC KI and 1 PW. The PW was identified as a member of the KI BN, Dong Nai Regiment. The PW stated that one of the KI was the AO of the C22 Recon Company, Dong Nai Regt (documents substantiate this). The PW also stated that the KI BN was located in the Ba Da Secret Zone and that his company was located vic YT062355 where it was regrouping and retraining.

(d) 1st Regiment, SA-4 (Thu Duc Regiment): During the 2nd Offensive the newly organized 1st Regiment of Sub-Region 4 was assigned the mission of attacking the Newport Bridge and the 9th Precinct of Saigon. Recently captured documents reveal the battles in which the 1st Regt took part during the May Offensive. On 4 May, D2 (2nd BN, 27th Regt) attacked Phuoc Long Post and D4 (4th Local Force BN) attacked the Newport Bridge (XS 93-942). ARVN Marines reacted and documents state that losses were 17 KI and 31 WI. On 7 May D4 overran Van An Post (unk location) but lost many weapons and had to leave its WI on the battlefield. The results of this attack was 2 VC KI and 5 WI. On 11 May, the 4th Local Force BN reinforced by the artillery element of the Regt attacked the Newport Bridge again. D4 succeeded in destroying part of the bridge but D2, which was to intercept PAF, PA/ARVN reinforcements, withdrew from the ambush sites without orders from higher headquarters and lost the opportunity to attack the PAF/RVNAF convoys. The results of this attack were 3 KI and 7 WI. On 13 May, the 1st Regt performed counter PAF/RVNAF operations, with D4 operations in Binh Trung (XS940925) and the D2 BN operating in Thanh Ky Loi (XS 9392). Combat coordination between D2 and D4 was poor and when liaison with the Regimental HQ was discontinued, various elements fought in disorder. While documents only mentioned 27 VC KI, 13 WI and 1 PW, 5th ARVN Marines claim 67 VC KI and 3 PWs. 18 May D4 attacked the Binh Khanh Post, a Special action unit attacked the Ong Tranh Post and D2 attacked Phuoc Long Village (XS 9597). D4 overran Binh Khanh Post but failed to capture any enemy weapons. D2 failed to accomplish its mission and lost 2 KI and sustained 3 WI. On 3 June, vic XS 9392, a rallier turned himself in. The rallier stated that the 4th Local Force BN with a strength of 100 men was located vic AS93-954, B/2-18 and engaged an unknown number of VC moving west resulting in 5 VC KI. Documents identified the KI as members of the 82mm Mortar Company, 274 Regt (possibly acting as a support of the 1st Regt). From 10 to 15 June the 1st Regt withdrew for reconsolidation. On 15 June vic XS994944, D/2-18 A/I engaged 3-4 VC resulting in 2 VC KI. A notebook identified the 2nd Company, 4th Local Forces BN. On 19 June, vic YS029986, a US Navy PBR element captured a PW from Group 84. The PW stated that elements of Group 84 were on their way to Thu Duc to reinforce the D2 BN, Q4 Regt (D2, 1st Regt). On 20 June, a Chieu Hoi rallied vic XS943986. The rallier was identified as a member of the 4th LF BN. On 1 July, vic XS 9296, a rallier from the 2nd Co, 4th LF BN turned himself in to the Phuoc Long ARVN. He stated that the 1st and 2nd Co's of the 4th BN with a total strength of 60 men were dispersed along two canals: Huol Nguon XS954945 and Dat Set XS964946. The rallier further stated that the 2 Co's were to attack Thanh An OP (XS938926). Also on 1 July, vic

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

...VDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational report of 1st Infantry Division for Period ending
31 July 1968, ICS CSFOK-65 (d), (u)

X5982946, D/2-18 M engaged 2 VC resulting in 1 VC KIA. Documents identified the KL as a member of the 4th LF Bn. The documents also outlined plans for Subregion 4 for the months of July, August and September to include an attack on Saigon and Hwy 316. On 5 July, vic X5922000, a Chieu Hoi rallied to the Thu Duc Hqs. The rallier stated he was from the 1st Co, 4th Local Force Bn. Lu Van idi, asst plt ldr of the 2nd Plt, 2nd Co, 4th En, 1st Regt rallied to 2-18 MDF on 8 July. The rallier stated that his company had attacked a bridge about 15-16 days ago vic X5994 on Hwy 316. He further states that his company coordinated with another U/I company. As a result of this attack 75 men of his company were either KIA or WI. On 17 July, vic X5933931, D/2-18 engaged and captured 1 VC. The VC was identified as Lu Hoc Diep, AD of the 4th LF En, Diep stated that his battalion had suffered many casualties as a result of a contact at Long Mon (X59995) approx six weeks prior to his capture. He further said that on 1 June; he had received instructions to prepare for the 3rd Offensive. Documents captured 21 July, vic Y5042930, by a Navy Seal Team provided additional information on Diep's instructions; and additionally furnished considerable background information on the 1st VC Regiment. Information in the documents indicated that the regiment had been instructed to prepare for the Third Offensive between 15 June and 30 July, and that all preparations were to be completed on 5 August. The documents also indicated that the 1st Regiment was to direct its efforts against Saigon's 9th Precinct & Newport Bridge. An unlinked report found among the documents indicated that the regiment itself had been formed on 26 April 1968 from two understrength battalions, four Combat Support companies, one special action platoon, one district level company and various small HQ elements. The regiment was given an AO which encompassed the Thu Duc District and the 9th Precinct (old Thu Thien District). They do not appear to have deviated from this AO since their activation.

(c) Artillery Units: enemy artillery units have been identified only occasionally in the T.OI during the period 1 May - 30 July. The second offensive which took place in early May was characterized by frequent rocket and mortar attacks. The number of attacks decreased sharply in June and the attacks became sporadic in July. Allied operations and a shortage of ammunition was probably responsible for this decrease.

1. 208th Rocket Regiment: There is considerable evidence to indicate that the 3d Battalion, 208th Rocket Regiment operated within the T.OI during this period. On 22 Jun, a contact vic AR23049 resulted in six members concluding the CO of the 7th Co, 3rd Bn, 208th Rocket Regiment being killed. On 23 June a PW stated that the CO of the 208th, Nghiеп, was killed and that the PW was wounded in an airstrike in Binh by vic XT 9033. On 24 June a PW captured vic AT 5500 indicated that the 3/208th was assigned to the 273C Regiment for mid-June attacks in the Northern area of Saigon. On 24 June, AR Forces captured a PW who identified his unit as the 2/208th. The PW stated his unit has just crossed the Saigon River in the last few days and that the 1st and 2nd battalions were ONCON to the 9th VC Division and the 3/208th ONCON to SH-1. On 2 July a PW said sub-region 5 was reinforced by a Rocket Battalion belonging to 208. He stated their targets were: HU LOI, BI N and Saigon. On 20 July a PW captured from the 3/208 stated the 7th Co. was loc vic AT735044, the three companies planned to meet at KP840054. Their intentions were to rocket Saigon, but failed because of allied Operations and loss of a Rocket Cache vic XT 02070.

2. 96th Artillery Regiment: There has been a tentative identification of a new Artillery Regiment subordinate to the 69th Artillery Command. The unit's designation is the 96th Artillery Regiment; the regiment is

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AMDB-T (NHD)

SUMMARY: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, ICS CSPOm-65 (id), (U)

probably composed of the 52nd Bn, K33 and K34 are two Arty Bns that infiltrated from II CTZ in late 1967, and were formerly subordinate to B3 Front in II Corps. The 52nd was dropped as a unit directly subordinate to the 69th Artillery Command, and documents have linked the 52nd Arty Bn and the 96th Artillery Regiment. The K33 and K34 are two additional units from II Corps and since there haven't been reports of another regimental size Arty Unit it is assumed that they are subordinate to the 96th. The 52nd was located in the Phuhol vic AF640-221 on 29 May 68. Documents captured from the 52nd indicate they now have 107mm rockets. A firing table for 107mm rockets captured at the same time indicates the 52nd was probably responsible for the 27 May attacks on Cu Chi. K33 was identified by captured documents on 30 April 68 west of L.I. KH. K34 was identified east of Saigon on 3 May 68. Documents on 31 May 68 indicate the K34 has moved west of L.I. KH.

3. 34th Arty Regiment: The 34th Artillery Regiment, or its subordinates were identified only twice during the period. An undated letter was captured 2 July 68 vic IS 0391 probably written by the CO of 2/84th. The writer states the problems he is having securing and maintaining supplies of rockets. On 4 July a PW from 2/34th was captured AS976916 the PW gave the location of a rocket cache vic AS969917 by a collapsed bridge. The area was searched and the cache was discovered and evacuated. The PW stated the mission was to fire 107mm rockets at the Phu Duc Officers Training Center and 122mm rockets at the Presidential Palace.

(f) Song Be Regiment: On 5 May 68 the Song Be Regt conducted an attack by fire on Bi Duc with a ground attack by the 211th and 212th Bns. Attacks by fire were also made on Huoc Long, An Loc and many other installations in MR 10. Many of the local force companies aided in these attacks by fire and ground attacks. The regt has not been in contact since 5 May 68, but have probably been involved in harassing fires used to cover up for troops and supply infiltration past US/NVN installations.

(5) Local Force Units:

(a) During the reporting period, local force units supported main force units by acting as guides, reconning objectives, and replacing supplies. Local force units have also been used to screen the movements of supplies and troops by harassing fire. In the Second General Offensive local force battalions were used as the lead element during the attacks on the Saigon area, as in the Tet Offensive. The local force battalions which participated in the 2nd General Offensive, however, had been reorganized into regimental-sized units to improve the enemy's command and control.

(b) The enemy local force units in III CTZ have undergone a radical reorganization since TOT. The old local force battalions have disappeared and in their place new regimental-level units have been formed, in or near the Division TOI.

SONG BE REGIMENT:

211th MF Bn
212th MF Bn
7th 82mm Mortar Co
8th 75mm Art Co

NUST THANG OR 273C REGIMENT:

1st MF Bn
2nd LF Bn
3rd LF Bn (went to Dong Nai Regt in early April)

CONFIDENTIAL

WDB-T (NHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1966, RCS USFOR-VN (d), (U)

4th Gia Dinh Supply Bn

THU DUC OF 1ST ARMY DT OF SR 4:
2nd Bn, 274 Regt
4th LF Bn
C3 and C5 Cos, 5th Div

(c) During the last reporting period, local force companies appeared to be attempting to form into battalion-sized units by upgrading themselves. On the whole this appears as a failure. Only two LF companies have become multi-company units, but they have remained basically the same sized units as before.

(d) It was noticed that several of the local force companies have changed their ops slightly in the past few months, especially after TET. It appears that C61 has shifted its op somewhat eastward toward the Linh Ky area. This change may have secured to facilitate the infiltration and possibly the movement of supplies. A com-mi-liaison person stated he had taken 24-300 man infiltration groups from the Linh Ky area to the Lai Khe area, possibly to the Tripozi or Long Nguyen Secret Zone. While C61 may or may not act as com-mi-liaison, they would probably act as security guard for the movement of infiltration groups. C62 and C63 have also seemed to have generally stayed closer to the Saigon River area in the past months, this may be to facilitate the movement of troops and supplies on route into the Saigon area. Throughout this area, there are more people, which would call for more activity in proselyting and collecting supplies, etc.

(6) THE MAY OFFENSIVE:

(a) The May Offensive, or the second offensive occurred during the period covered by this report. The May Offensive began with a series of coordinated attacks on 30 April and 1 May during which enemy forces harassed RF/FF outposts and attacked RVN installation at Ben Cat and Trang Bang. On 2 May, the pattern was repeated at Duc Hoa, and on 3 May a PFOI was attacked with mortar fire six kilometers west of Tan Son Nhut Air Base. During the night of 3-4 May, Tay Ninh City received an attack by fire. These actions were probably designed to screen enemy troop movements toward Saigon, and the enemy completed his redeployment of troops forward assembly areas by 3 May. During the period 5-11 May, the enemy attempted to complete the deployment of troops around Saigon; and to conduct another offensive into the city. However, allied operation prevented the successful accomplishment of this mission. After it became evident that the enemy could not enter Saigon in force, he resorted to infiltration in small groups in order to continue disrupting friendly activity in the Capital. While several platoon-sized groups did succeed in entering Precinct 6, they were unable to link up and conduct coordinated operations.

(b) 1st Infantry Division units fought two sharp battles with enemy units on the periphery of the Capital Military District during the May Offensive. On 5 and 6 May, elements of the 1-4 Cav contacted the 165th NVN Regiment southeast of Phu Lai (vic AR6135 and CG2126) and killed 440 VC/NVN. As a result, the 165th Regiment withdrew from the CMZ area in survival status. On 7-8 May, C/1-28 engaged the K3 Battalion, Dong Nhieu Regiment west of Thu Duc (vic AR891992). Killed 65 enemy. As a result of this contact, the regiment moved to position north of Lai Thieu. In the middle of May enemy units which had been a part of the May Offensive against Saigon moved into "close in" base areas in the vicinity of the Capital. Units remained in these areas and attempted to maintain pressure on the Saigon area throughout May and the first part of June. Some attempt was

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NVDB-T (NHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, ACS CSPOR-35 (NL), (U)

made during this period to move again against Saigon, but these attacks were uncoordinated and ineffective. By the end of June, units had moved out of the Saigon area. The regimental-sized units which had remained near Saigon since early May (Dong Nai, 8th, 101st, Thu Duc, and 273C Regiments) had suffered significant casualties during the period.

(7) Character of the Enemy Threat: The enemy appears to be making preparation for renewed offensive operations. The number of enemy forces in and around the 1st Division T.OI is as it has ever been in the past, and the quantity and quality of equipment available exceeds that of previous periods. During the hours of darkness the enemy can move on foot with almost complete freedom in more than 80% of the area of the T.OI. Because of effective camouflage, heavy jungle or rubber tree canopy, and with his ability to pass his troops as civilians, the enemy is able to move relatively in many areas of the T.OI during the day. No operations to deny the enemy foodstuffs have succeeded for more than a short period of time due to the numerous sources of food available to enemy procurement agencies. In short, as long as new enemy personnel continue to be committed to the III CTZ there are no obstacles which make it impossible for the enemy to equip, feed, train, move and deploy his units. There are no physical reasons why the enemy cannot launch offensive operations against almost any target in the T.OI. The decision to or not to engage in major combat lies almost entirely with the enemy. However, his probability of military success in any type of major combat is very low. The recent loss of valuable cadre probably makes the enemy less combat effective, man for man, at this time than he has been in past years. While future attacks may occur at separate locations on a coordinated basis, Saigon remains the most lucrative target for propaganda purposes. Indications are that the enemy believes that his political and psychological goals would be furthered by a new series of offensive operations. It also appears that the enemy believes that in order to achieve the maximum effect from these offensive operations they must be launched during the period spanning the National Party Conventions and the Presidential election in the United States. It is likely that these attacks will be launched simultaneously at several targets in the CTZ with the seizure of penetration of Saigon and the CBD as their ultimate goal.

(8) See inclosure 23, an assessment of the NV./VC Posture from 1 August 1967 to 1 August 1968.

f. Logistics:

(1) During this reporting period, 63 resupply convoys were conducted between DI NL and L.I KHL totaling 170,220 vehicle miles. Convoy vehicles totaled 5,674 for an average of 68 vehicles per convoy. Thirty resupply convoys were conducted between DI NL and QU.N LOI averaging 98 vehicles per convoy and 203,904 vehicle convoy miles.

(2) US Air Force airlift support to division base camps and forward areas, was increased over the previous reporting period due to tactical operations being conducted out of two airlocked forward areas, LOC NINH and SONG LU. Support rendered by aircraft type was: C-130, 106 sorties; C-123, 144 sorties; C-7A, 1,896 sorties. Transported were 30,712 passengers and 2,599,065 lbs of cargo.

(3) The 1st S&T Bn continues to support division operations from DI NL with forward support platoons at THU LOI, L.I KHL and QU.N LOI. A semi-permanent aircraft refueling facility was completed at L.I KHL Base Camp on 27 July equipped with a 350 gallon per minute fuel pump which de-

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSPOR-65 (RL), (U)

creases refueling time significantly.

(4) The 701st Maint Bn continues support at division base camps. Permanent contact teams from Headquarters and A Company were located at PHU LOI and LAM KHUE, the latter was operational on 17 June. Special contact teams and technical assistance teams are dispatched on a daily basis and as required by organic and attached units.

.g. (U) Organization:

(1) Major reorganization took place within the 1st Infantry Division during the May, June, July reporting period. On 7 June MTO 7-175T, Infantry Battalion, was implemented. Basic organization included Headquarters and Headquarters Company consisting of 15 officers, 2 warrant officers, and 144 enlisted men, four rifle companies consisting of 6 officers and 150 enlisted men each and a combat support company consisting of 4 officers and 96 enlisted men. The 1st Infantry Division has continued to attach the 4.2 inch-mortar platoons to the artillery battalions organic to the division. This concept has proven it's worth. By supplementing the artillery, it is felt that better use is being made of the 4.2 inch mortars. Normally, four mortar platoons are employed in base camps and the remainder utilized in fire support and patrol bases throughout the division tactical area of interest. The tactical situation in Vietnam warrants consideration of placing the 4.2 inch mortars at brigade level.

(2) During June, the 105mm towed artillery battalions underwent the change over to the 6-155G series MTOs. The rank structure and equipment levels have generally proven adequate to meet the needs of the units. The 155/8 inch battalion underwent the change to MTO 6-355 in July. Generally, this was considered an improvement over the echo series TOS with the exception of the loss of 12 cargo carriers, M-548. The cargo carrier is much better suited to the terrain and conditions found in Vietnam than are wheeled vehicles, particularly for carrying ammunition. Another major item, which the artillery unit commander consider necessary for safe operation of the howitzer, is the control group M/Giu. 39, which is employed at each gun. Telephones authorized for this purpose are not only wasteful in manpower but lend themselves to errors when giving firing commands. An increase in M/Giu. 39 should be considered when drafting TOS in the future making provision for one at each howitzer section.

(3) At present the 1st Infantry Division is operating without a tank battalion. The terrain here in III Corps tactical zone lends itself to the use of armor. The tanks found in the tank company attached to the division and those found in the organic armored cavalry squadron are proving to be of great value. Because of the jungle and the heavy mines found in many areas of the tactical area of interest, a medium to heavy tank is considered far superior to newer armored vehicles such as the Sheridan. The M-48 tank has proven very successful in this area.

(4) During April the Combat Intelligence Battalion (Provisional) was organized with an authorized strength of 55 officers, 10 warrant officers, and 353 enlisted men. The mission of this battalion is to provide command and control, management and dissemination of all available information and intelligence obtained or developed in support of the division. To provide Battlefield Information Center/Battlefield Information Control Center (BIC/BICC) support to the division, to provide administrative and logistical support to subordinate and attached elements, and to train assigned and/or attached elements.

(5) The battalion is presently undergoing testing, which began in July, to test the feasibility of this type of an organization.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOM-65 (1.1), (U)

h. (U) Psychological Operations:

(1) Psychological operations this quarter were aimed at three prime target groups:

(a) Civilians

(b) VC soldiers and their relatives

(c) NV. soldiers

(2) During the quarter 20,477,100 leaflets were dropped and 816 hours and 15 minutes of loudspeaker broadcasts, 310 hours and 10 minutes ground operations, were employed in support of the division. The following is a breakdown, by unit, of these support operations.

<u>UNIT</u>	<u>LEAFLETS</u>	<u>BROADCAST TIME</u>
1st Brigade	5,407,000	117 hours 20 minutes
2d Brigade	6,860,100	542 hours 5 minutes
		(301 hours 10 minutes ground operations)
3d Brigade	8,210,000	156 hours 40 minutes
TOTAL:	20,477,100	816 hours 15 minutes

i. Civic Action/Civil Affairs:

(1) Command emphasis has been placed on US/Vietnamese relationships. MACV Command Information Office has recently published fact sheets on Vietnamese attitudes and customs, which are distributed for reading. Military papers have emphasized civic action projects.

(a) The 1st Division IO has given maximum coverage to civic action. In July the division had twelve civic action articles in newspapers, primarily the 1st Division Traveler.

(b) Some of these articles should have been more informative. For instance, one article was boastful of the marvelous deeds of a Division unit which contributed supplies to the Vietnamese. The article should have been expanded to include the Vietnamese efforts and initiative in the project.

(2) The opening and securing of the highways in the Division T.OI contributed to the pacification effort. Yet the opening of roads has also brought about its problems, such as traffic incidents resulting in increasing deaths and injuries to pedestrians. The COFS, G5 has emphasized the need for safety in newspaper articles and in the monthly CIV/SYOF Newsletter. In a cooperative venture the G5 and G3 Sections have produced brochures, posters and billboards to emphasize to the need for traffic safety and good US/Vietnamese relations.

2. (C) Section 2, Lessons Learned: Commanders's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel.

(1) Classification, Assignment and Utilization of Personnel.

(a) OBSERVATION: The number of replacements received during the quarter did not equal all types of losses (WIS, rotation, reassignment and

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL), (U)

casualties) and the total enlisted strength of the command has gradually decreased.

(1) EVALUATION: The enlisted strength decrease can be attributed to the strength ceiling of 101.1% of authorized. It has become increasingly evident that personnel required in excess of authorized to perform headquarters and base camp functions must be at the expense of combat and combat support battalions, which has resulted in a gradual decrease in "foxhole strength".

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A strength ceiling of 103% of authorized should be instituted.

(2) Power Generator Repairmen:

(a) OBSERVATION: An insufficient number of trained power Generator repairmen (MOS 52D) were available to the 701st Maintenance Battalion.

(1) EVALUATION: The 29-15x TDS provides for seven power generator repairmen and one assistant. Five of these men are assigned to the main support company and one is assigned to each of the forward support companies. The CONUS school trained generator repairmen are fully qualified to troubleshoot and repair all military standard generators and have the training in generator theory required for repair of non-standard equipment. As a result of a shortage of power generator repairmen, the battalion was required to use powermen (MOS 52E20) in these slots. Powermen are only trained on the 1.5, 3, 5 and 10Kw generators, and do not have the necessary background to troubleshoot and repair the electrical system in motor-generators.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Additional school trained power generator repairmen be provided to fill the spaces presently authorized, and that one more MOS 52D be authorized in each forward support company, due to the high density of generators in Vietnam.

(3) Field Strength:

(a) OBSERVATION: Consolidation of administrative and logistical functions greatly increases the percentage of personnel present for duty in forward areas.

(b) EVALUATION: During the reporting period, the average field strength of the organic battalions remained around 80% of the present for duty strength. This substantiated the study made in Jan 68 which indicated that certain administrative and logistical functions at battalion level could be consolidated and release more personnel for field duty.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Whenever possible, administrative and logistical functions should be consolidated under a central controlling section.

b. Operations.

(1) RON positions versus NDF:

(a) OBSERVATION: During this period battalions made use of successive RON positions instead of the better fortified but more permanent NDF.

(1) EVALUATION: RON positions allow for greater mobility and flexibility and better coverage of an AO. They obviate the need for extensive logistical support and free larger forces for offensive operations.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(c) RECOMMENDATION: In areas where large enemy troop movements or concentrations are not anticipated and where tactical surprise and mobility are desired, RON positions should be used.

(2) Employment of Air Cavalry:

(a) OBSERVATIONS: During this period, the brigades employed attached Air Cavalry for immediate exploitation of intelligence information and as a screening force rather than for miscellaneous quick reaction missions, RRF, or intelligence gathering.

(b) EVALUATION: Air Rifle Platoons and Air Cavalry produced excellent results when assigned an aggressive, highly mobile role in support of, or in conjunction with, the overall Brigade operation.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That Air Cavalry special capabilities be exploited in offensive roles.

(3) Operations of VC Local Force Units:

(a) OBSERVATION: Local Force VC units main activities have been in preparing to assist main force units for the next offensive by collecting taxes, food, information, reconning for overnight way stations, and guiding main force units through the area. They have also recruited local villagers as laborers for carrying supplies and maintaining supply caches.

(b) EVALUATION: Increased seal and search operations have hampered local force activities. This causes the main force units increased hardships in attempting to sustain themselves in combat in populated areas.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Emphasis on village seal should be maintained in an effort to eliminate popular support of main force units.

(4) Air-mobile towers for Night Defensive Positions:

(a) OBSERVATION: The range of the small radar installations at the night defensive positions of the division are limited by many factors. Some of these are due to their position at ground level. They are shielded by armored vehicles and small terrain irregularities.

(b) EVALUATION: A small tower with sufficient height to clear surrounding vehicles, bunkers and defensive positions was provided. Design incorporated such considerations as rapid mobility for ease of transporting the tower, and stability for a ground surveillance radar in addition to an observer. Units employing these towers express satisfaction and have found it necessary to move them as NDP positions change. See sketch attached to Inclosure 9.

(5) Engineer support for river search operations.

(a) OBSERVATION: In current river search operations in the vicinity of Saigon, it is necessary for the boats to penetrate the nepa palm without being damaged.

(b) EVALUATION: The pneumatic assault boat proved unsatisfactory for this purpose. It could not be maneuvered rapidly when the boats were attached and after each operation, a great deal of time was required to patch and inflate the pneumatic boats. The light tactical raft half-section was used and has proved to be satisfactory. The aluminum bow can penetrate the

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

nepa palm without being damaged and the boats require a minimum of maintenance. The 25-horsepower outboard motors are utilized by providing marginal speed when the boats are loaded and are attacked from the shoreline. Within the stress limits of the transom, a larger motor should be used to provide greater maneuverability under fire.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: An outboard motor in the 40- to 50-horsepower range should be provided to power the light tactical raft half section. Requisition action has been initiated by the 1st Engineer Bn.

(6) Preparation for Movement:

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of Engineer mine-sweep teams and mine detectors in advance of convoy movement is essential.

(b) EVALUATION: By positioning mine-sweep parties along the route of march in pairs, the teams can sweep from a central point in two directions and open the route in half the time it would take if only one party was used. Mines are located by the detectors and by alert and experienced engineers who notice irregularities or disturbances in the roadway. Mines so located are blown in place, saving personnel, equipment and convoy delays. Experience has shown that the mine sweeps should never walk a line from a command mine. These are invariably booby trapped and have resulted in several casualties.

(7) Underground Cable.

(a) OBSERVATION: Underground or buried cabling for division communications at Lai Khe.

(b) EVALUATION: During the enemy's second offensive, the outside plant facilities were again put to a severe test. It was noted that even greater protection and diversification was needed than that provided by diverse routes and multiplicity of cable pairs. As a result, underground cables were installed, and the majority of the division headquarters communications cabling is now underground.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: That any cabling for permanent base camp operations be buried for greater protection.

(8) Secure Voice, Ground to Ground.

(a) OBSERVATION: The limited range of the KY-8 secure voice crypto device continued to be a major problem in the ground operations of the CG secure net.

(b) EVALUATION: The KY-8, working with an RT-524, has a range of approximately 40KM. The 1st Bde is located approximately 65KM from division headquarters. Using a normal AB-577 antenna 65 feet high, secure voice can be established with the 1st Bde less than 10% of the time. To overcome this problem, the 121st Signal Battalion has extended the AB-557 to a height of 80 feet which has added a reliability factor of 60% which remains inadequate. The Signal Battalion is now in the process of procuring an AB-216/U micro-wave tower which will provide a height of 120 feet and should allow a reliability factor to the 1st Bde of 90%.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That all division base camps located in dense jungle or rubber tree area be augmented with a minimum of four AB-216/U towers. The towers cannot only provide good FM communications, but can

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

be used to extend VHF and UHF communications.

(9) Secure Voice in the Command and Control Ships.

(a) OBSERVATION: The KY-28 has proven to be a compact, rugged and simple to operate piece of secure voice equipment. The method of keying the KY-28 is fast and leaves very little chance of error. Operation of the KY-28 can be learned very quickly due to the simplicity of the operator controls and indicators. However, the maintenance problems encountered with the use of the KY-28 covers a large area.

(b) EVALUATION: The use of the KY-28 decreases the range of the radio. This is due to the requiring of a clear, strong signal for synchronization of the KY-28. At the present time, retransmission of the secure voice is not possible. However, secure voice retransmission capabilities will be available on or about the third quarter of fiscal year 1969 with the issue of the HYL-3, regenerator repeater. The maintenance of the KY-28 may become a problem because of the lack of maintenance personnel and lack of repair parts. The density of cryptographic equipment within the division has increased by 125% in the last three months and will increase another 50% by the last of October. Although the equipment density has more than doubled, the maintenance personnel authorized has remained the same. The increased emphasis on the use of secure voice for the command net requires numerous checks of all ground stations and airborne secure equipment. At the present time, the cryptographic maintenance personnel average working fourteen hours a day and are frequently called out at night. There are not spare KY-28 components available at this time for issue to the 1st Infantry Division DISTRA. This will require the turn-in of all inoperative equipment to the support maintenance facility located at Long Binh. This method is time-consuming and requires a great deal of administrative work. Of the 10 KY-28's in use during the last 20 days, 2 have become inoperative. DISTRA has been notified by the support maintenance facility that necessary repair parts are not available for the KY-28's.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Strong emphasis be placed on augmenting the division TO&E with additional crypto repairmen.

(10) Dial Central Office (DCO):

(a) OBSERVATION: The 1st Infantry Division requires long distance telephone facilities far greater than those now presently existing. The division operates from four main base camps with many units operating from all four locations. The administrative services for the division are presently located in Di An.

(b) EVALUATION: The Army Area Communication System has installed a DOC at the Lai Khe base camp but has placed a 30% Class A restriction on the telephones. Due to this restriction the Danger Main and Danger Support switchboards carry many administrative calls which should go over the Army area switchboards.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a division-wide calling area be installed with no class restriction. The 30% Class A restriction should apply to calls outside of the division area.

c. Training.

(1) Night Training of the Individual Soldier

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RI) (U)

(a) OBSERVATION: Continued emphasis should be placed on night training of the individual soldier.

(b) EVALUATION It has been found that the individual soldier has not received enough training in the conducting of night operations, e.g., use of stealth when moving at night, selection and positioning of night ambush patrols, land navigation and the effectiveness of noise and light discipline during night operations. It is a proven fact that unsuccessful night operations can be attributed to the preceding comment.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: More emphasis should be placed on night training of the individual soldier prior to coming to Vietnam. Fifty percent of Vietnam-oriented training should be concentrated on night operations with emphasis on night movement, night ambush patrols, and light and noise discipline during hours of darkness.

(2) Medical Training for Crewchiefs and Gunners:

(a) OBSERVATION: With the increasing threat of the Third Offensive in the near future, the Aviation Battalion evaluated the level of emergency first aid training among the aircrew members assigned to the organic companies. It was determined that refresher training was necessary to review emergency procedures and the administering of first aid by any crewmembers.

(b) EVALUATION. The importance of first aid and the measures at the disposal of crew members to assist injured personnel on the aircraft cannot be over-emphasized. This training is being conducted by the Battalion Flight Surgeon and will be scheduled as part of the initial orientation of all new crew members as well as conducting training on a continuing basis.

(3) Flight Standardization Program:

(a) OBSERVATION: A review of the high accident rate within the Brigade Aviation Sections was made. This study revealed that replacement aviators were being assigned directly to the brigades after arriving in country and receiving a checkout in the OH-13S helicopter. This policy was immediately changed in that all aviators destined for Brigades would first be assigned to Company B from 45-90 days and perform the less demanding missions until such time as their proficiency had increased to the point they could be considered a safe and accomplished aviator. At the same time, an experienced and school-trained IP was assigned to the S-3 section to monitor and supervise a division standardization program. A definite initial orientation training program has been established and is being adhered to.

(b) EVALUATION: The standardization program and the assignment policy of aviators to the Brigade Aviation Sections has significantly improved the experience level of aviators within the brigades as well as reducing the number of accidents and incidents over the reporting period.

(4) Radio Relay and Carrier Attendants (MOS 31M20):

(a) OBSERVATION: It is the experience of this battalion that the personnel now being received in the MOS 31M20 are not fully trained in two principle areas:

(b) EVALUATION:

1 The personnel now arriving in the battalion in the MOS 31M20 are

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968 RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

severely lacking in training in antenna erection and trouble shooting procedures. In some cases, the personnel have only experienced a demonstration of antenna erection and consequently when the time arrives to erect an antenna, they have little or no practical knowledge.

2. The battalion is also experiencing long system and circuit outages due to the inability of the 31M20 personnel to troubleshoot the equipment effectively. At the present time, the 31M20 personnel are troubleshooting the equipment by replacement of components, rather than by symptom. Upon the reestablishment of the system, no one knows what was wrong with the system and the components that were replaced are turned in to maintenance as being inoperative. This adds to the already overloaded maintenance system.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That the program of instruction for the 31M20 course be revised to allow more time in the areas of antenna erection and troubleshooting procedures.

d. Intelligence.

(1) Essential Elements of Intelligence.

(a) OBSERVATION: Throughout the performance of normal missions, the aviators of the 1st Aviation Battalion are in position to observe and report information on activities in the Division TAOI. There has been much timely intelligence information passed to collection agencies in the form of spot reports. Conversely there is often a reluctance to report everything observed. Many times the crews take the position that, "surely this has already been reported." Constant instructions and reminders are required to keep the flow of information coming in.

(b) EVALUATION: The importance of timely intelligence cannot be over-emphasized. All aircrews should be briefed prior to each mission on what to look for and how to report what they see. Thorough debriefings are also necessary to establish all pertinent facts and disseminate same.

e. Logistics.

(1) M113 Engines:

(a) OBSERVATION: During a period of about two months, there was an inordinately high rate of failure of M113A1 engines.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to the requirement for rapid repair and return of combat vehicles, many M113A1 engine failures were diagnosed incorrectly, and many engine assemblies were replaced unnecessarily. As the supply of engines became low and work requirements slack, more time and effort were expended on diagnostic techniques used to determine why the engines failed. A number of engines were found to have a blower motor drive shaft broken, thereby permitting no air to get to the engine for combustion. The shafts were replaced and the engines became fully operational. It was found that the shaft will break when an engine is accelerated suddenly or turned off while operating at high RPMs.

(c) RECOMMENDATION:

1. That thorough diagnostic procedures be used whenever an engine is inspected.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

2. That blower motor drive shaft checks be added to the trouble-shooting check list in the M113A1 engine manual (TM 9-2815-205-34P). This check should be made when the engine fails to develop power.

3. That drivers be cautioned about consequences of rapid acceleration or deceleration of the engine.

(2) Generator Administrative Deadlines:

(a) OBSERVATION: Units are denied the use of some deadlined engineer equipment for excessive periods of time.

(b) EVALUATION: Many repair parts for engineer equipment are extremely scarce. Often it is easier to get replacement end items than repair parts. Most equipment requiring field maintenance requires parts to complete the repair. Due to the scarcity of parts, engineer equipment remaining on deadline for 45 days may be turned in for replacement. A DA Form 5-23 must be filled out by the direct support unit and then be forwarded to an administrative headquarters for review and approval. In most cases approval is automatic. The using unit is often required to operate without the equipment for over 50 days, while the supply system is tested for the part and administrative action is taken. The fact that the same part may be required for a number of pieces of deadlined equipment has no effect on the 45-day wash-out criterion. Each item must await parts for 45 days before the DA Form 5-23 can be approved. Only after the item has been turned in may the supported unit request a replacement.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That authority be delegated to the direct support level to determine disposition of all engineer equipment and that discretion be allowed in applying the wash-out criterion.

(3) Field Repair of OH-13S Engine Mount Bracket:

(a) OBSERVATION: An OH-13S helicopter was sent to one aircraft maintenance company with a 15/16 inch long crack at the aft end of the engine mount bracket on the center frame. This would normally require a center frame change.

(b) EVALUATION: After close inspection of the crack and area affected, it was determined that a repair could possibly be made. Weighing the man hours expended during a center frame change and the time the aircraft would be non-mission ready against the possibility of a satisfactory repair made by a highly skilled welder, it was determined that a repair would be attempted. A repair was made by stop-drilling the crack (a small hole was drilled at each end of the crack). The crack was then welded and a reinforcing plate welded over the crack at the aft outside of the bracket. The repair was inspected by a technical inspector and the maintenance officer and found to be satisfactory. A report of the repair was submitted to the Bell Helicopter Company engineers by the local Bell Helicopter Technical Representative. A reply was received stating that Bell Helicopter engineers had concurred with the repair.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That prior to attempting a field expedient repair which is not specifically authorized by appropriate technical manuals, a technical representative be contacted for his concurrence on the proposed repair.

(4) Use of Tech Reps to Increase Aircraft Availability.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(a) OBSERVATION: A $\frac{1}{4}$ -inch long nick approximately one half way through the aft cross tube was found on an AH-1G (Cobra) landing gear. The nick was beyond limits.

(b) EVALUATION: At this time the cross tubes FSN 1620-973-1873 were in short supply in the Republic of Vietnam. According to the technical manual, no repair could be made. The cross tubes are made of 7075T6 riveted repair would result in changing the spring rate and the shock absorbing characteristics; consequently, this was not acceptable. To maintain the aircraft to structural limitations was required. Contact was made with the chief Bell Helicopter Technical Representative, and the AVCOM stress engineer was located in Saigon. It was determined that the aircraft could be flown with this condition but could not be used to practice touchdown autorotations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That technical experts be contacted when critical equipment required repairs for which authority is not granted by the appropriate manuals. These experts are prepared to evaluate problems and authorize field expedient repairs.

(5) Use of Contact Teams to Supplement a Forward Support Maintenance Company.

(a) OBSERVATION: The concentration of units at one Division base camp reached such proportions that it became inefficient to support them from a central maintenance point.

(b) EVALUATION: Maintenance support of the Lai Khe area had been provided by a reinforced forward support company with a strength of 130 men. A study of the situation revealed that a separate contact team in the base camp would increase the efficiency of the maintenance effort while allowing a reduction in the size of the forward support company. The contact team was tailored to support certain divisional and non divisional units in all facets of direct support maintenance except supply. It was decided that the forward support company could provide the repair parts supply activity for the base camp. As a result of the division of responsibilities, the units of the base camp are receiving better maintenance support, performed in a more efficient manner.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That whenever a forward support company is supporting more than an Infantry Brigade and its normal attachments, serious thought be given to establishing a contact team from the headquarters and Main Support Company. Such a contact team should have the same maintenance capability as the forward support company, on a reduced scale.

(6) Ballistic Helmets.

(a) OBSERVATION: Ballistic helmets that were due in-country in late April 68 per USARV AVAHV-LOG have not been received as of the end of the reporting period. The requirements were furnished USARV through DSO. 1st S&T Battalion by letter. Followup action has failed to get these items released.

(b) EVALUATION: It is of prime importance that all personnel be equipped with the proper equipment to perform a given assignment. There has been one case in the Aviation Battalion where a ballistic helmet, if available, might have saved the life of a crew member.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That command action be taken to obtain the ballistic helmets for each aircrew member assigned to the 1st Infantry Division.

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending 31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(7) Rigging for Aerial Resupply.

(a) OBSERVATION: Rigging operations at NDPs and resupply pads are not up to standards.

(b) EVALUATION: Due to large personnel turnover with Brigade, rigging teams are not properly trained. To overcome inefficiency and avoid waste, losses and accidents, personnel involved in resupply must be trained in rigging procedures.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That a continuous "Rigger Training Program" be conducted for all battalions by the 213th Assault Helicopter Company.

f. Organization. None

g. Other.

(1) Night PsyWar Missions.

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of night PsyWar missions to further remove the cover of night from the enemy have proven to be highly effective when targeted against known units on the ground. Such messages when they mention members of the unit by name tend to demoralize all members of the unit.

(b) EVALUATION: Night PsyWar missions have proven to be a highly effective tactical tool. According to Hoi Chanh interviews, such missions tend to demoralize the enemy and lower his will to fight.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that the use of night PsyWar missions be used when units and members of the unit can be positively identified.

(2) Artillery Leaflet Dissemination.

(a) OBSERVATION: Use of artillery leaflet rounds were tested during the quarter. Results of the test indicate that approximately 80-90% of the rounds failed to function.

(b) EVALUATION: The high rate of duds indicates that the present rounds, which are over 15 years old, are inadequate to perform the mission.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that new artillery leaflet rounds be procured and retested.

(3) Targeting.

(a) OBSERVATION: Feedback from Hoi Chanh interviews and IPW reports indicate that targeting is more effective when directed against known weaknesses of an identified unit.

(b) EVALUATION: The targeting of a leaflet or tape against a known weakness of a unit, and, where possible, mentioning members of the unit by name, lend a credibility to the propaganda thus increasing its overall effectiveness.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that targeting continue on selective rather than general targets.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

(4) Coordination Meeting.

(a) OBSERVATION: The Binh Duong Province PsyOps Coordination Committee met twice during the month of July. Members of the committee consisted of representatives of Binh Duong Province, 1st Infantry Division, 25th Infantry Division, 101st Air Mobile Division, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 5th ARVN Division.

(b) EVALUATION: Meeting of this nature tends to greatly improve the coordination between units, and leads to a better understanding not only between American units, but also between the American and ARVN units operating in the area.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Recommend that meetings of this nature be encouraged wherever possible.

(5) PSYOPS Broadcasting.

(a) OBSERVATION: Recent innovations in Brigade PSYOPS broadcasting operations have greatly aided the PSYOPS operations of the Brigade.

(b) EVALUATION: These innovations have helped reduce the reaction time for PSYOPS missions.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Disseminate the following comments to other S-5s and PSYOPS Detachment Commanders: A new loudspeaker frame with 500-watts output has been designed and tested with outstanding results. The unit is 50% lighter than the old 1,000-watt unit, and can be installed by one man in 10 minutes on a UH-1D or OH-6 aircraft. An operational quick reaction mission has already been flown by an OH-6 Cayuse aircraft. Effectiveness of the message in terms of clarity is essentially the same as the 1,000 watt system. Maximum ceiling flown was 1,500 feet due to cloud formation.

(6) Armed Propaganda Team.

(a) OBSERVATION: The Armed Propaganda Team (13 ex-VC led by two ARVN Polwar Sergeants) remains an unqualified success.

(b) EVALUATION: Face-to-face propaganda to the civilian population continues on a 7-day basis. Intelligence acquisition, a byproduct of their primary mission, has contributed greatly to our intelligence efforts.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: The use of Armed Propaganda Teams and propaganda movies at rallies and hamlet festivals has been proven effective in reaching captive audiences in a subtle, acceptable manner.

3. (C) Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information.

Cover and Deception. (Techniques as reported in the previous report continue to be utilized.)

FOR THE COMMANDER

22 Incl

- 1 Organizational Structure
- 2 ~~List of Key Commanders~~
- Withdrawn, HQ, DA

M. S. HEVZDOS
M. S. HEVZDOS
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

AVDB-T (MHD)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1) (U)

-3--1st-Bde-ORbb-----
-4--2d-Bde-ORbb-----
5 3d Bde ORLL
6--Support-Command-ORbb-----
-7--Division-Chemical-Section-ORbb- Withdrawn, HQ, DA
-8--1st-Aviation-Bn-ORbb-----
9--1st-Engr-Bn-ORbb Withdrawn HQ, DA (Incl Sketch not withdrawn)
10--1st-Signal-Bn-ORbb-----
11--1st-MP-Gr-ORbb-----
12--Unit-locations-1-May-1968-----
13--Unit-locations-4-May-1968-----
14--Unit-locations-7-May-1968-----
15--Unit-locations-28-June-1968-----
16--Unit-locations-20-July-1968-----
17--Photographs,-Operation-GIANT-SWATH--- Withdrawn, HQ, DA
18--Overlay,-AO-DUTY-VI-----
19--Overlay,-AO-VOODOO-----
20--Overlay,-AO-BLACKHORSE-----
21--Overlay,-AO-FENCE-----
22--An-Assessment-of-the-NVA/VC-Posture-
from-1-August-1967-1-August-1968-----

DISTRIBUTION:

3 CG, IIFFV, ATTN: G-3 Analysis
1 CG, IIFFV, ATTN: 7th MHD
3 CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHGC (DST)
1 CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHCS-MH
2 CINUSARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT
1 OCMH, DA
4 17th MHD

AVFBC-RG-H

1st Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period 1 May 1968 -
31 July 1968, (RCS CSFOR-65)

DA, HQ II FFORCEAV, APO San Francisco 96266

SEP 1968

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHGC(DST), APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPCP-OT, APO 96558

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. Subject report is forwarded.

2. This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational Report -
Lessons Learned of the 1st Infantry Division for period ending 31 July 1968.

FOR THIS COMMANDER:


O. B. FORY
1LT, AGC
Asst AG

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (19 Aug 68) 2d Ind (C)

MAJ Klingman/ds/LBN 4433

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1), (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 11 OCT 1968

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1968 from Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning classification, assignment and utilization of personnel, page 27, paragraph 2a(1). This headquarters recognizes the gradual decrease in total enlisted strength. This decrease reflects a change in USARV strength posture from slightly over authorized strength to slightly under. As the authorized strength of the command approaches the Department of Defense imposed ceiling, stringent efforts are required to prevent the reoccurrence of overstrengths such as experienced in the past. However, this headquarters is presently committed to maintain the combat elements of the command at 103% of authorized strength in MOS 11B and at 100% authorized strength in all other MOS; this results generally in maintaining 101% of overall enlisted strength in the combat units.

b. Reference item concerning engineer support for river search operations, page 29, paragraph 2b(5): Concur. The unit will be cautioned not to notch the ponton transom.

c. Reference item concerning secure voice, ground to ground, page 30, paragraph 2b(8). The unit assessment of the value of the AB-216/U antenna tower, in providing increased reliability in radio communications is valid. Records indicate that the 1st Infantry Division has five towers on hand. The unit will be advised that NTCOL action should be initiated to obtain authority for the number of towers required.

d. Reference item concerning secure voice in C&C ships, page 31, paragraph 2b(9). DA was made aware of critical shortages of COMSIC maintenance personnel on 24 June and again on 17 August 1968, at which time this headquarters requested that all outstanding requisitions for these personnel be filled. On 17 September, DA announced that 38 personnel (MOS 31S20) had been assigned against USARV requisitions with arrival dates during September 1968. Upon arrival, these personnel will be assigned to divisions and separate brigades to insure that each division has a minimum of six, and each brigade a minimum of two qualified personnel. In addition,

40

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (19 Aug 68) 2d Ind (C)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1), (U)

this headquarters has recommended establishment of seven 15-man COMSEC Divisional Contact Detachments (CDCD), one detachment for direct support to each division. CDCD's will be authorized subsequent to the identification of trade-off spaces by this headquarters to DA on or about 15 October 1968.

e. Reference item concerning dial central office (DCO), page 31, paragraph 2b(10). The desirability of intra-division telephone service with no class restrictions is recognized. However, the Division TAOR is larger than the area serviced by the Lai Khe Dial Central Office. It is not technically feasible to extend Class A access outside the area serviced by the dial central office, in order to permit a division-wide calling area with no class restrictions. The limit of 30 percent of subscribers having Class A access is dictated by the design criteria of the Southeast Asia Automatic Telephone System (ATS) which is being installed in Southeast Asia, and will include the Lai Khe Dial Central Office.

f. Reference item concerning night training of the individual soldier, page 31, paragraph 2c(1): Concur with the recommendation that night training should be emphasized during Vietnam oriented training.

g. Reference item concerning radio relay and carrier attendants (MOS 31M20), page 32, paragraph 2c(4):

(1) The US Army Southeastern Signal School (USASESS), Fort Gordon, is the CONARC school responsible for training radio relay attendants and repairmen. The late arrival in Vietnam of trained operator and maintenance personnel in respect to new equipment arrivals is a problem which was brought to the attention of a CONARC Liaison Team during a visit to USARV in April 1968, and to the Commandant, USASESS in correspondence from this headquarters. As a result of the USARV recommendations, changes have been made in the course POI and training on the new AN/GRC-50 and PCM equipment began in July 1968. POR training has been removed from the POI for technical courses, including the radio relay and carrier attendant courses. This has increased the time devoted to trouble shooting and antenna erection.

(2) The USAESS provides the initial technical training with student input limited to those individuals meeting established criteria. This criteria is based on student capabilities required to successfully complete the course, years of training experience, current needs of the Army, and qualifications of enlistees and inductees. The improvement of the technical and leadership capabilities of the individual soldiers remains a command responsibility.

41

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

AVHGC-DST (19 Aug 68) 2d Ind (C)

11 OCT 1968

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 1st Infantry Division for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (RL), (U)

h. Reference item concerning M113A1 engines, page 33, paragraph
2e(1): Concur. The new USARV Pamphlet 750-18, now in the final stage
of revision, will include a caution on rapid acceleration or decel-
eration of engines.

i. Reference item concerning ballistic helmets, page 35, paragraph
2e(6): Concur. This headquarters has forwarded to USAMC a request to
accelerate procurement of these items.

j. Reference item concerning rigging training, page 36, paragraph
2e(7): Nonconcur. Change 4 to USARV Regulation 350-1, dated 25 July
1968, established a division level helicopter load preparation training
program designed to ensure that all units engaged in heliborne operations
maintain an appropriate number of personnel trained in the proper tech-
niques of helicopter load preparation.

k. Reference item concerning artillery leaflet dissemination, page
36, paragraph 2g(2): Concur. Serviceable rounds are in the pipeline.
USARV Regulation 75-1 directs units to initiate a malfunction report
when they encounter a lot of unserviceable ammunition.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

J.C. Arntz

W. C. ARNTZ
CIAAC
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:
HQ II FFV
HQ 1st Inf Div

42

CONFIDENTIAL

GPOP-DT (19 Aug 68) 3d Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report of HQ, 1st Inf Div for Period Ending
31 July 1968, RCS CSFOR-65 (R1)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 14 NOV 1968

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.


FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. Shortt

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

43

PRECEDING PAGE BLANK-NOT FILMED



* 8 Infantry battalions and 1 infantry battalion (mechanized)

ASSIGNED UNITS

HHC 1st Inf Div
Co F, 52nd Inf (LRP)
HQ HQ and Band Spt Co d
1st Ad in Co
1st iP Co
701st Maint Bn
1st S&T Bn
121st Sig Bn
1st Engr Bn
1st Avn Bn
1st Med Bn
1st MI Det
50th MI Det
266th Crl Plat
242d Crl Det
43d PI Det
44th PI Det
17th Mil Hist Det
1st Sqdn 4th Cav

HHC 1st Bde
1st Bn 2d Inf
1st Bn 26th Inf
1st Bn 28th Inf
41st Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
HHC 2d Bde
2d Bn 16th Inf
2d Bn 18th Inf
1st Bn 18th Inf
35th Inf Plat (Scout Dog)
61st Inf Plat (Co:bat Tracker)
HHC 3d Bde
2d Bn 2d Inf (MECH)
1st Bn 16th Inf
2d Bn 28th Inf
HH Btry Div Arty
1st Bn 5th Arty
1st Bn 7th Arty
2d Bn 33d Arty
8th Fn 6th Arty
234th FA Det (Radar)

ATTACHED UNITS

340th Avn Det

OPCOUR UNITS

B Co, 2d 34th Ar or
D Btry 71st Arty (2 QUAD 50)

A Btry 5th Bn 2d Arty (-)
1st Plat I Btry, 29th Arty
(6 Soct)

Incl 1

44

U.S. ARMY OF THE ARMY
HELIPLANTERS, 3RD BATTALION AND LAI KHE BASE
1st Infantry Division
APO 96345

AVIB-WB-C

6 August 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report of 3rd Brigade for Period Ending 31 July 1966,
RCS/CSFOH-65 (M1) (U)

Commanding General
1st Infantry Division
ATTN: AVIB-T (MHD)
APO 96345

1. (C) Section 1. Operations: Significant Activities

a. Intelligence: The enemy launched his second offensive in early May. Counter offensive operations conducted in Lam Son against battalion size elements set the enemy back in his efforts to generate momentum in the second phase of the planned attacks on Saigon. The VC and NVA forces suffered heavy losses in the tactical area of operation. Enemy initiated activity and ground contact has declined to such a degree that it is believed he has delayed his ideas of a third offensive for the present, in hope of reorganizing militarily and politically. It is a general consensus that VC/NVA forces probably have gone into a resupply and retraining period in order to reevaluate this present situation. The enemy has avoided contact by not returning fire and chooses instead to flee, which leads us to believe that he has received some instructions prohibiting him from directly engaging Allied Forces.

b. Operations: During the reporting period the Brigade participated in operation Toan Thang. Brigade continued tactical overwatch of Ben Cat, security of Lai Khe Base Camp and secured Phouc Vinh Base Camp and outlying installations between 23 May and 4 June and again between 13 July and 16 July. During May the Brigade conducted extensive land clearing operations around Lai Khe and in the "Rocket Belt" west and north of Lai Khe while conducting RIF operations and night ambushes in these areas and in northern Lam Son. After 12 June the focus of operations shifted to the "Catchers Mitt" to the east and later to the "Trapezoid" area in the west. Brigade is now operating along the Song Be north east of Lai Khe and around the Lai Khe area. The only significant single engagement during the reporting period took place on 5 May when Company D, 2-26 Infantry and L Troop, 3-11 ACR engaged an unknown sized VC force at 1535 hours vicinity KT935237 in Lam Son. Air and artillery were employed and contact was broken at 1945 hours. The sweep of the battlefield produced 70 VC KIA (EC), 6 VC WIA, 12 M47 rifles, 4 RPG-2 launchers, 7 RPG-7 launchers and 1 M60G launcher. A significant find occurred on 5 July in the Trapezoid area when Company B 2-26 Infantry at 1151 hours discovered a cache of 55 107MM rockets, 440 RPG-2 and 522 RPG-7 rts at AT591361.

c. Logistics: The majority of operations during the reporting period were resupplied from Lai Khe base Camp with a small portion of resupply coming from Phouc Vinh. The brigade supported a total of 7,400 troops with 16,142 tons of cargo that were moved over HWY 13 and 27 tons that were air lifted to Lai Khe.

2. (C) Section 2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) Strength:

(a) Observations: Units must constantly operate at less than authorized strength.

45

Incl 5

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) Evaluation: Rifle company field strength is normally reduced by casualties, CIC training, base camp requirements and R&R, especially in the NCO grades.

(c) Recommendation: That personnel be cross-trained to perform several requirements, i.e. rifleman, crew served weapons gunners, ATC's and that all personnel be trained for leadership tasks. Most rifle squads are being led by specialists and SGT, E5. Continued emphasis on NCO training must be stressed at all levels. Commanders must tailor their organizations to meet personnel shortages.

(2) Morale:

(a) Observations: Morale in ~~the field units~~ continues to be high. Morale among base camp units is less than desired.

(b) Evaluation: Field troops have a sense of mission, not normally found among headquarters and support troops. Troops in the field have the satisfaction of accomplishing missions with tangible results, whereas those in the base camps feel that in many cases their primary job is not recognized or essential and that their duties with base camp defense should be accomplished "by someone else".

(c) Recommendation: That a base camp TD be studied where possible and that commanders at all levels make every effort to instill in their personnel the importance of each man fulfilling the units essential and basic mission, to include Base Camp Defense.

b. Operations:

(1) RON positions versus NDP:

(a) Observation: During this period the Brigade has made use of successive RON positions instead of the better fortified but more permanent NDP.

(b) Evaluation: RON positions allow for greater mobility and flexibility and better coverage of an AO. They obviate the need for extensive logistical support and free larger forces for offensive operations.

(c) Recommendation: In areas where large enemy troop movements or concentrations are not anticipated and where tactical surprise and mobility are desired RON positions should be used.

(2) Employment of Air Cavalry:

(a) Observations: During this period the Brigade employed attached Air Cavalry for immediate exploitation of intelligence information and as a screening force rather than for miscellaneous quick reaction missions, R&F, or intelligence gathering.

(b) Evaluation: Air Rifle Platoons and Air Cavalry produced excellent results when assigned an aggressive highly mobile role in support of or in conjunction with the overall Brigade operation.

(c) Recommendations: That Air Cavalry special capabilities be exploited in offensive roles.

(3) Employment of Close Air:

(a) Observation: Whenever contact was established fighters were put in as close as possible to the point of contact on the ground sometimes necessitating pull back of friendly troops. The enemy recognizing this technique would move quickly out of the way sometimes leaving a few individuals in the contact area to screen.

2

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) Evaluation: Air strikes put in according to this doctrine usually missed the main body of enemy troops.

(c) Recommendations: The most significant results are obtained when the fighters cover a greater area by starting 200 to 300 meters to the enemy rear. Air support is then walked toward friendly forces covering the flanks as much as possible.

c. Training: NONE

d. Intelligence: BICC

(a) Observation: The new BICC intelligence collection concept employed during the month of July established a new dimension in the field of intelligence.

(b) Evaluation: The BICC concept has greatly increased the intelligence gathering capabilities at battalion and brigade levels.

(c) Recommendation: That the BICC concept be supplied with the necessary communication equipment and visual reconnaissance capabilities to expand upon it's present collection process.

e. Logistics: Rigging for aerial resupply.

(a) Observation: Rigging operations at NDP's and resupply pads are not up to standards.

(b) Evaluation: Due to large personnel turn over with Brigade, rigging teams are not properly trained. To overcome inefficiency and avoid waste losses and accidents, personnel involved in resupply must be trained in rigging procedures.

(c) Recommendation: That a continuous "Rigger Training Program" be conducted for all battalions by the 213th Assault Helicopter Company.

f. Organization: NONE

g. Civic Action:

(1) Vietnamese involvement in civil assistance.

(a) Observation: A GP large tent which was set up at village entrance was willfully torn apart. The tent was installed in May to provide shelter for the people while they were waiting for transportation.

(b) Evaluation: The tent was set up as a temporary measure to protect the people from the elements. Since the villagers themselves were not involved in the project they did not care for it at all.

(c) Recommendation: Projects should be fully coordinated with GVN officials and projects should involve the people as much as possible. All structures in any civic actions project should be of a permanent nature to prevent damage and vandalism.

(2) Following through on civil assistance projects.

(a) Observations: Dental trough was constructed at Lai Khe hospital. This trough is quite elaborate and very well made. However it is not being used and is falling into a state of neglect and disrepair.

47

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(b) Evaluation: This project though quite important, failed because there was a lack of interest by the people and a lack of supervision by the civil affairs party who started this project to see to it that the trough was used properly.

(c) Recommendation: Projects such as the Dental Hygiene trough need constant supervision by trained personnel. Projects should be geared so that the VN officials can eventually take over the program for themselves without US help. Also the project must be within the needs of the people to begin with. If the projects are pushed upon them, no matter how important, they will fail.

3. (C) Section 3, Headquarters, Department of the Army Survey Information.

a. Reference: 1ST INF DIV Confidential msg, cite AVIB-T(MD) 2351, SUBJ: Tactical Cover and Deception (U) dated 2 April 1968.

b. Land Clearing Operations:

(1) Observation: These operations by nature are open invitation to VC mines, booby traps, claymores and ambushes.

(2) Evaluation: To make these operations worthwhile vehicle and personnel losses must be held to a minimum by detailed planning.

(3) Recommendation: Cover areas to be plowed and areas to be traveled by vehicles with night ambushes. Sweep out the area with troops and combat vehicles before the start of each day's operations and outpost. Make deceptive cuts at the end of each day but do not cut out a race track for the following day's operations until the following morning.

c. Ambush site occupation and recon.

(1) Observation: Reconnaissance of ambush site is a must but a compromised ambush site is worthless.


(2) Evaluation: Reconnaissance and occupation of ambush site by moving directly into it can be avoided by tactical deception.

(3) Recommendation: Make reconnaissance by moving thru the intended site without stopping to another position, preferably one from which the site can be observed. This operation can be repeated as necessary. Choose a daylight lesser position which the patrol can occupy after passing the actual ambush site. Move back into ambush position only under cover of twilight or semi-darkness.


E.C. Acuff
EARL C. ACUFF
Col, Inf
Commanding

CONFIDENTIAL

AIR MOBILE TOWER



INCL to (Withdrawn) INCL 9



UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R & D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author) HQ, OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Confidential
	2b. GROUP 4

3. REPORT TITLE Operational Report - Lessons Learned, HQ, 1st Infantry Division (U)
--

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates) Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 May - 31 Jul 68

5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name) CG, 1st Infantry Division

3. REPORT DATE undated	7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES 51	7b. NO. OF REFS
8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.	8b. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) 683262	
8c. PROJECT NO. N/A	8d. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)	
d.		

10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT	11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES N/A	
	12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY OACSFOR, DA, Washington, D.C. 20310	

11. ABSTRACT

The following items are recommended for inclusion in the Lessons Learned Index:

ITEM 1

* SUBJECT TITLE _____
** FOR OT RD # _____
***PAGE # _____

ITEM 2

SUBJECT TITLE _____
FOR OT RD # _____
PAGE # _____

ITEM 3

SUBJECT TITLE _____
FOR OT RD # _____
PAGE # _____

ITEM 4

SUBJECT TITLE _____
FOR OT RD # _____
PAGE # _____

ITEM 5

SUBJECT TITLE _____
FOR OT RD # _____
PAGE # _____

* Subject Title: A short (one sentence or phrase) description of the item of interest.

** FOR OT RD # : Appears in the Reply Reference line of the Letter of Transmittal. This number must be accurately stated.

***Page # : That page on which the item of interest is located.

- - FOLD - -

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for
Force Development

ATTN: Operational Reports Branch
Headquarters, Department of the Army
Washington, D.C. 20310

MAPLE

DA Label 1B, 1 APR 59 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS LABEL ARE OBSOLETE.

- - FOLD - -

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN DELIMITED
AND CLEARED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
UNDER DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.20 AND
NO RESTRICTIONS ARE IMPOSED UPON
ITS USE AND DISCLOSURE.

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE;
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.